The appeal chamber of the ICTY has revoked the verdict in the case against Tihomir Blaškić, and the entire case is being returned to court, from the beginning. HVO General Tihomir Blaškić, who was sentenced to 45 years by the ICTY two years ago for the massacre of Muslim civilians at Ahmići in 1993, will receive a new trial, in light of new evidence which the defence team has collected since the new governments have been in power in Zagreb and in Sarajevo.

Petković’s false testimony: HDZ told Petković to blame Blaškić General Milivoj Petković, HVO Chief of Staff refuted all the key elements of the Blaškić defence stemming back to the time when Blaškić was commander of the Croatian units in the Lašva Valley. Unlike Blaškić who claimed he only commanded HVO units under the command of the General Staff, Petković claimed that he also commanded special unit forces. He shifted all the responsibility onto Blaškić, saying that Blaškić did nothing to punish those who committed the crimes at Ahmići.Documents already entered into evidence in the first trial will also be reconsidered in this new light. For the same reasons, many witnesses who were already questioned will be called before the court again. This comes from the position of the Appeal Chamber of the Hague Tribunal, outlined in their ruling dated October 31, 2002, and by which a session will be held with both the prosecutor and defence invited to display the new evidence in the Blaškić case, at which time the ruling will be made regarding a “decision on a new trial for certain points of the indictment, and perhaps the entire indictment”.

From the reasoning provided, it is clear that the position of the appeal chamber is that the masses of new documents work in Blaškić’s favour and there is no doubt that the first verdict and sentence will be dramatically changed.

Tihomir Blaškić was found guilt on March 3, 2000 on all counts of the indictment regarding crimes against Bosniacs in Central Bosnia, including the massacre in Ahmići, and he was sentenced to 45 years imprisonment. The defence team submitted their appeal to the verdict and the sentence and, after two and a half years of preparation, handed over a great amount of new evidence to the appeal chamber which were not available during the original trial from 1997 to 1999, and which were only made accessible following the change of government in Croatia and the opening of the military archives.

Regulation 115

In accordance with regulation 115 on entering new evidence, the appeal chamber assessed some 50 documents as acceptable, considering that they were “convincing” and “unavailable earlier” and that the “indicate the possibility that the verdict was not founded”. There are also a number of documents that do not satisfy the criteria outlined in regulation 115, but the appeal chamber has accepted as they indicate the possibility of an unfounded verdict.

The new evidence, which the defence were not able to access during the trial, indicates that perhaps the Blaškić sentence was neither founded nor just, concluded the appeal chamber. Blaškić’s attorney, Anto Nobilo took advantage of the opportunity to appeal, in which the entering of new evidence is permitted only “in cases where new facts are learned which were not known during the proceedings before the trial chamber or the appeal chamber, and which could be a deciding factor in passing a verdict”. In that case, the defence or prosecutor can submit their request for the verdict to be re-examined.

Over the last two years, Nobilo has collected much evidence which was not available during the rule of Franjo Tudjman and HDZ. All this material needs to be carefully considered, considering that this gives all the evidence to date a new light, and the court will have their hands full in establishing the new facts.

Defence finally receives documents hidden by HDZ

Nobilo has made it clear that the coalition government in Croatia has helped him to collect the evidence to prove Blaškić’s innocence, or rather, to prove the double line of command by which he cannot be guilty nor could he have known about the crimes in Ahmići before they happened. According to what Blaškić told the court, when the Ahmići massacre occurred, on April 16, 1993, the operation was conducted by the HVO military police under the command of Paško Ljubičić. Learning that he had received a phony report from Ljubičić on Ahmići, a Muslim village, had been levelled to the ground without any military reason, Blaškić, as the commanding officer in the HVO Operative Zone, demanded a report and investigation from the local head of SIS Ante Slišković.

He received the answer that Serbs disguised in Croatian uniforms had been responsible for the massacre. Unsatisfied with that response, he repeated his order twice, but the investigation was never carried out.

Nobilo’s defence of Blaškić was based on proving that as commander in the Operative Zone in the Lašva Valley, he was only a front for the underground HDZ organization and special HVO police units which conducted the ethnic cleansing. When the HDZ government realized just where Nobilo was headed, they obstructed the defence team. Every relevant document became unavailable, as did defence witnesses who, if they were available were not useful. Though HDZ decided in 1996 to send Blaškić to The Hague, their idea was to display him as a victim of a conspiracy against Croatia in order to sweep away the accusations of Croatia’s participations in the international conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina. Blaškić was to have been the sacrificial lamb, however Nobilo’s approached clouded up the HDZ plans.

Veselin Marinov

This is particularly evident during the testimony of Veselin Marinov, who was recently killed in a Zagreb café by Vinko Žuljević Klica. Marinov corroborated the Nobilo’s theory on a double line of command in the former Herceg Bosna and its military units. Marinov explained that the HVO military police and special units called the “Vitezi” (knights) were under the command of the Defence Ministry of Herceg Bosna in Mostar, and not by Blaškić’s Operative Zone and the General Staff. Marinov was once a HVO soldier himself and Blaškić’s colleague.

When the judges objected, stating that such a situation existed in no army in the world, Marinov responded that they were likely right, but that this was the case in HVO.

Considering that the former government was hiding the documentation which could help Blaškić and Nobilo, its election defeat opened up the doors to previously inaccessible material. Primarily, this refers to documents found in the HIS archives, belonging mostly to HVO, and which supports the defence theory of a double line of command. In the Office of the President, numerous documents were found which refute his guilt for the events at Ahmići. Then there are new witnesses, which can testify to each and every one of Blaškić’s claims, like those which Nobilo came to in his own investigation.

Finally, even the prosecutor’s office later received documents from Army BiH, and handed them over to Nobilo and his team, which further shed light on the Blaškić position as well as the HDZ influence on the underground, military and intelligence communities, as well as the sacrifice of Blaškić with the aim of protecting “greater national interests”.

It was these “greater national interests” that was Tudjman’s favourite phrase to cover up all the dark secrets of his regime, fearing his own destiny most. That is, his national security advisor, Markica Rebić convinced him that if Dario Kordić was to be found guilty, then that would mean that Mate Boban, late president of HDZ BiH and founder of the Croatian Republic of Herceg Bosna was guilty, as well as Tudjman himself. Such that the final goal in the extradition of Blaškić and all that the former government did to aid the prosecution and work against Blaškić’s defence would directed at protecting the Croatian state leadership, which not only approved but also stimulated and actively participated in the conflict in BiH and its division.

Great operation to save HDZ

Both Boban and Tudjman knew how and why the massacre of Muslims at Ahmići happened, just as they know that Blaškić’s role in the event was negligible. Later investigations confirmed that an analytical team was in SIS working on the problem of war crimes, and it was Markica Rebić which handled that team. This team was responsible for covering up the war crimes and in obstructing the ICTY, as well as in obstructing the defence of those accused. This group participated in giving those accused of committing crimes against Muslims new identities, while a portion of their activities were directed at covering up those truly responsible for the crimes at Ahmići.

The SIS group led by Stipe Udiljak participated in and helped prepare the witnesses for the defence, particularly General Milivoj Petković, which was under their instruction for days. Millions of kunas from the state budget were also spent on this group.

Convinced he was untouchable, Markica Rebić sent a letter to Miroslav Šeparović, then director of HIS, in which he complained about Nobilo’s defence strategy, objecting that Nobilo was unnecessarily expanding the guilty circle and insisting on a double line of command. Miroslav Šeparović, contrary to Rebić’s expectations, was very much in favour of a fair trial for Blaškić and an important ally for Nobilo among the state leaders who were not inclined favourably towards Blaškić. Which is one of the reasons why he was forced out of his position as Chief Intelligence Officer.

The ruling by the appeal chamber of the ICTY to retry Tihomir Blaškić will open up a series of new issue. In addition to removing the burden of guilt off Blaškić, which is evident from the session called for November 21, it is indubitable that the role of Croatia in Bosnia Herzegovina will be reinvestigated, as will the character of that conflict. This refers primarily to the HDZ leaders, both in Croatia and BiH, regardless of the fact that some are deceased – Tudjman, Šušak, Boban – the retrial of Blaškić, which the appeal chamber considers to be most just in light of the quantity and nature of the new evidence will be yet another instance of facing the darker side of the former Croatian government and state policies which HDZ ran in both countries.

Furthermore, the very opinion that the appeal chamber considers this new evidence to “indicate the possibility that the Blaškić verdict was unfounded” is a very clear sign of concern for all those who participated in the war in BiH, as well as for those who worked to cover up the real criminals.

Tudjman ordered Blaškić to go to The Hague: Markica Rebić hid documents which could aid Blaškić for years

Blaškić was practically forced to The Hague. This is seen in the minutes of his meeting on March 28, 1996 with Ljubo Ćesić Rojs, then Defence official and Krešimir Ćosić, then Deputy Defence Minister and Miljenko Crnjac, then commander of Tudjman’s military cabinet. These three men, in the presence of Dunja Zloić who recorded the minutes, made up the delegation which passed on the order from Franjo Tudjman and Gojko Šušak that Blaškić would unconditionally go to the Hague, within 24 hours.

Convincing him that his going was of national importance, and that his defence would also defend those interests, Ćosić and Crnjac convinced him that Markica Rebić would collect all the necessary documents, even though in an earlier SIS raid of his apartment many imperative documents went missing, some of which were key for his defence. Every argument by Blaškić against an immediate departure to the Hague, and his requests for only a two week delay, were instantly rejected by Ćosić and Crnjac, stating that this was of national interest and that it had been ordered so by Franjo Tudjman and Gojko Šušak. There was no written order, and the Law on cooperation with the ICTY was only voted in after Blaškić left for The Hague, which raises the question of how he was extradited at all. The documents that could have aided Blaškić were hidden for years by Markica Rebić.