NATO’s second stage of enlargement proved to be a “big bang” but not as big as some would have wished. As was widely expected, Croatia was left out in the cold. In reality, noone in Zagreb or Brussels calculated that Croatia would be admitted in the trans-Atlantic security club at this juncture. Nevertheless, the time has now come for Croatia’s political leaders to position the country at the head of the third round of enlargement. Zagreb must speak and act as a future NATO member.

Participation in out-of-area peace-keeping operations is a promising domain. Croatia needs to be aware that several other NATO contenders are already making contributions to the U.S. campaign against terror. For instance, a unit of Albanian commandos was dispatched to Afghanistan in August and offers have been made by Tirana to assist in future American missions. Albania has long conducted its foreign and security policies as though it were already a NATO member. It gave evidence of credibility when it routed Serbian forces in Krajina and western Bosnia during the summer of 1995. Croatia was a late starter in the NATO process and did not qualify as a credible candidate for several valid reasons. First, the Tudjman legacy continues to weigh heavily on the country, especially in terms of NATO’s perceptions and the process of Croatia’s internal reforms. The current government has faced an uphill struggle in changing the country’s international image and displaying its unequivocal commitment to “European values.”

Second, there is ongoing international irritation over Croatia’s record of cooperation with the war crimes tribunal. Whatever the merits of General Janko Bobetko’s indictment, it has sparked resentment in Western capitals and anger in Croatia and must be quickly resolved for Zagreb’s benefit. Croatia has certainly proved more cooperative with The Hague than Serbia and should not be punished over this controversial indictment.

Third, policy makers in Washington and elsewhere have expressed dissatisfaction with the pace and scope of restructuring in Croatia, especially in rooting out or neutralizing the old nationalist and criminal structures. Half way through its term in office, the government is credited with notable progress but also with insufficient competence and consistency. The political and military reforms enacted thus far have warranted Partnership for Peace (PfP) status but not an invitation to NATO.

And fourth, there was undoubtedly a calculation among some decision-makers that Croatia’s admittance into NATO would further isolate Serbia and exacerbate tensions in Belgrade during a difficult political and transition. Unfortunately, some shortsighted western leaders would like to see Croatia and Serbia admitted simultaneously into the Alliance as a form of “regional balance.”

NATO’s Next Steps

No political consensus has thus far emerged regarding any subsequent rounds of Alliance enlargement. However, three options are likely to evolve as the debate develops. First, is the notion that enlargement has essentially stopped as the digestion of seven new members with diverse identities, strategic positions, and military capabilities will take both time and resources. Moreover, NATO is in the midst of its own modernization and retooling. Hence, the Alliance will simply not have the stomach for further growth in this decade.

The second option would consist of another combined accession, this time involving the remainder of the former Yugoslav republics plus Albania, in other words the often-styled “Western Balkans.” However, in this scenario the stronger candidates, such as Croatia, will have to wait for the weaker aspirants, including Serbia, to catch up before they themselves are granted membership. Such an option is equally discouraging as the first to the leading NATO contenders.

The third option would be the most promising and should be promoted by Zagreb and its friends. In this scenario, enlargement will no longer be conducted in phases or through regional groupings, but principally in terms of individual national merit. Every country will be judged strictly according to its reform successes, security efforts, and potential contributions to the evolving Alliance mission. Croatia could thereby qualify more quickly and be issued an invitation ahead of all other aspirants.

In the light of NATO decision-making, the Croatian authorities must decide whether Zagreb will seek to lead the next group for accession or essentially go it alone. In this equation, they must act on the premise that a commitment to regional stability and trans-national cooperation will earn the country greater merit than an exclusivist and isolationist approach that ignores its neighbors to the south. Paradoxically, regionalism will enhance individualism.

This much seemed to be realized by President Stipe Mesic when he met with the Albanian and Macedonian Heads of State at the NATO Summit in Prague. The three leaders made it clear that they intended to work together to promote regional cooperation and integration into both the EU and NATO. Albanian President Alfred Moisiu and Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski sketched out a joint plan to promote membership in the Alliance and their efforts will be closely followed and encouraged by Washington.

President Moisiu proposed regular meetings in each of the three countries’ capitals, noting that “regional security, market reforms, military reform, and the fight against terrorism can all be better resolved through closer cooperation.” Mesic stressed the importance of a European dimension to regional cooperation, especially if the EU helps to set up joint business ventures and infrastructure projects.

President Trajkovski highlighted the military and security aspects of cooperation, in that “the region today still is not safe, it is not yet a place of decent life. We are surrounded by a large arsenal of weapons and a large number of people who are getting rich through smuggling, corruption, and murder.” He argued that trans-national cooperation is the soundest approach for dealing with regional problems. But how can Croatia plug into this Balkan process that in some respects remains distant from its own realities, and indeed should it become more closely engaged?

Croatia’s Security Strategy

During Tudjman’s tenure, there would have been no regional dilemma. The strategic issue would have been presented in stark and simplistic terms. Franjo would have claimed that Croatia was not a “Balkan” state and therefore should have little or nothing to do with the barbarians to the south. In fact, the HDZ government would have probably argued that it is preferable to remain outside NATO than be assigned a Balkan identity.

But the issue is not so simple in the aftermath of NATO’s second round and the ongoing anti-terror campaign. If Bulgaria and Romania, both of whom were issued invitations to join NATO, are more strategically important for America and its Allies than either Croatia or Serbia, then how can Zagreb reposition itself to gain credibility and support as a partner and ally? It cannot move to the strategic Black Sea coast but it can act as a reliable bridge, conduit, supporter, and contributor between the Adriatic and the Danube.

To gain maximum leverage and advantage for its own national interests, Croatia should follow the policy of engagement and leadership. In this approach it can learn from the Lithuanian strategy in establishing the “Vilnius Group” almost four years ago. This initiative helped to accelerate the country’s drive toward NATO and greatly enhanced its credibility in Washington. Lithuania refused to adopt an arrogant position of superiority over any of its compatriots in the push for NATO accession, even though it received higher praise from military experts than all the other contenders for membership.

When the Vilnius process began, Lithuania was dismissed by most policy makers as having little real chance for NATO entry. But instead of canvassing simply for its particularistic interests and thereby narrowing its options, the ambitious government in Vilnius decided on a strategy of regional inclusion and mutual support with other aspirants.

Zagreb can likewise excel in this respect by exploiting the advantages it has available, even in comparison to Lithuania. Indeed, a “Zagreb process” could be launched early next year not just for NATO membership but for southern European security.

Militarily, Croatia has a capable armed force that has already proved its worth in actual combat. While Lithuania’s military was gradually created in a peaceful setting, Croatia’s was established during a bloody war. It gave evidence of credibility when it routed Serbian forces in Krajina and western Bosnia during the summer of 1995.

NATO and the U.S. will need fighters and not only talkers and Croatia may even offer contributions to various initiatives, including the planned “NATO Response Force” to consist of 20,000 rapidly deployable troops. Current non-membership should not disqualify the country from offering concrete assistance and indeed an ambitious and forward-looking approach may gain Zagreb respect and high marks in the White House.

Participation in out-of-area peace-keeping operations is a promising domain. Croatia needs to be aware that several other NATO contenders are already making contributions to the U.S. campaign against terror. For instance, a unit of Albanian commandos was dispatched to Afghanistan in August and offers have been made by Tirana to assist in future American missions. Albania has long conducted its foreign and security policies as though it were already a NATO member.

Zagreb has to assess its own strengths and requirements. For example, its special forces and intelligence gathering operations must be developed and made fully available to future trans-Atlantic coalitions. A focus on certain military or logistical specialization in American-led missions could bring substantial political advantages. Croatia could even exceed some current NATO members in its potential contributions.

And strategically, Zagreb must think big by positioning itself as the leader and promoter of the third round of NATO enlargement. This does not mean that Croatia’s entry would be contingent on the performance of other states. On the contrary, its own performance could be measured and enhanced by acting as a regional catalyst for cooperation with the Alliance. In this way, the third option of a non-block or individual invitation would become more feasible.

The Weaker Neighborhood

Croatia must also consider the position of states other than Albania and Macedonia that may become eligible for NATO’s third round. Serbia has made life extremely difficult for itself by supplying sensitive material, technology, and training to Iraq’s war machine. Even Belgrade’s chances for Partnership for Peace have receded as a result of its complicity in the “terror international.” Its failings have been compounded by inadequate military reform and a lack of consistent and genuine cooperation with The Hague war crimes tribunal.

Given Belgrade’s predicament and resistance to progress, can Croatia assist Serbia in getting on track for NATO? Several burning issues need to be resolved before Belgrade can be considered a credible candidate. The Union with Montenegro has to be legitimized, even though the arrangement looks temporary. And discussions need to begin on the final status of Kosova in which Serbia simply has to let go of the past. Croatia cannot realistically play a major role in either process, but it can help to encourage a resolution. However, in terms of economic and regional cooperation Serbia and Croatia can act as partners to resolve most outstanding bilateral questions.

Bosnia-Hercegovina will also remain a thorn in Croatia’s side. The current government in Zagreb has made a steady contribution to Bosnian stabilization but that state remains fragile and dependent on international institutions. It seems unlikely that it will be fully independent for the next decade. But this should not leave Zagreb in a gray zone if it can reinforce Bosnia’s integrity by encouraging the development of civic and democratic structures among the Croatian population.

NATO Criteria

In terms of domestic restructuring, Croatia needs to meet a number of important NATO criteria and display greater progress in its military reforms. Depoliticization, civil control, streamlining, professionalism, and modernization have not been completed. Zagreb must also think strategically in terms of NATO’s new missions, especially those outside Europe in the Middle East and Central Asia, and adapt its forces, equipment, and budgeting accordingly.

Zagreb should closely analyze NATO’s new “Prague Capabilities Commitments” intended to improve the alliance’s military preparedness and close the military gap between the United States and Europe. The PCCs identify the most urgent areas in which the European allies need to improve their military capabilities. This includes essential military enhancement from heavy transport aircraft through air tankers to precision-guided weapons and protection against chemical and biological weapons. If Zagreb can work diligently in any of these areas, its preparedness for interoperability with the new NATO will be greatly bolstered.

However, the primary criteria for NATO membership will ultimately be political. If a nationalist or unreformed HDZ were to be re-elected in 2004, on its own or inside a new coalition, then Zagreb’s chances for Alliance inclusion would significantly diminish. Much like Slovakia in the last round, Washington will be closely monitoring Croatian politics over the coming two years and will not be fooled by assurances of democratic reform if the evidence indicates otherwise.

And ultimately, NATO membership is also linked with EU entry. As President Mesic has pointed out, NATO membership would make all countries in the region participants in one security system and help develop values and standards that would improve chances for EU membership. Croatia should not expect to be included in the planned Union expansion in the coming year. However, it must accelerate its interaction with the EU and aim to meet the Aquis requirements for integration. EU-directed reforms will also boost its steps toward NATO.

To help position itself at the forefront of the road to NATO, Croatia also needs an effective lobbying effort in America and must work more diligently with the U.S. Congress. Zagreb also has to more effectively canvass for support among the most credible and pro-American new members in the Alliance such as Poland, Lithuania, and Romania.

None should assume that a NATO invitation will be automatic at the next Alliance Summit while Zagreb should not rest until it rejoins mainstream Europe. In sum, the future remains in Croatia’s hands.