Less than three months after the Prague summit, at which NATO members pledged their solidarity against international terrorism, key Alliance members are systematically destroying the trans-Atlantic link. The role of NATO, the only organization that keeps America closely engaged with Europe, is fraying at the seams as France and Germany are attempting to build a Western European coalition not only against the coming war with Iraq but against America’s leadership or “global hegemony.”

Angry Americans claim that the US invested great resources over the last 50 years in defending Western Europe and it is now time that Europe invests in its own defenseThe American Imperative

September 11th 2001 fundamentally altered America’s security and Washington’s view of international relations. The U.S. no longer felt adequately protected against mass violence inflicted on its citizens. But the new enemy was not conventional, identifiable, predictable, or operating within definable borders. It was an amorphous, clandestine, and opportunistic structure that deliberately targeted civilians. The enemy was international, cunning, and hidden, and the methods to combat it needed to be global, comprehensive, flexible, and at times even ruthless.

The Bush administration originally came into office on a pledge of restricting American intervention in unstable regions and using its military power sparingly. Paradoxically, since autumn 2001, Washington has become engaged in a continuous and massive military buildup and has launched a broad global offensive against terrorist cells and terror-sponsoring regimes. On the eve of the presidential elections, the Bush team also pledged that it would abstain from President Clinton’s allegedly failed and pointless “nation-building” exercises. Paradoxically, it is now engaged in even larger and more complex “state building” projects in Afghanistan and preparing to rebuild a post-war Iraq. Several other “failed states” and “post-rogue states” are on the list of possible future American projects, including North Korea and Iran.

Instead of withdrawing from a global mission, the U.S., as the sole superpower with unequaled military strength and enormous economic potential, is now intervening more intensively than ever before. And it is the thrust and nature of this engagement that has created rifts and conflicts across the Atlantic between the “New World” and the “Old Europe” of France and Germany. While 11 September dramatically and irreversibly altered American psychology and policy, it did not register to the same degree among Western European allies. In Paris and Berlin there were obvious expressions of sympathy for America, but little visible trauma and minimal long-term impact. Political leaders believed that they could soon return to “business as usual” across the Atlantic, and Washington much like Brussels would refocus on diplomacy, negotiation, and mediation before undertaking any important decisions. They were profoundly mistaken.

Washington and the “inner-European Union” have developed radically different approaches toward the campaign against international terrorism and outcast regimes. Two areas in particular have demonstrated these stark contrasts: threat perception and threat preemption. Both of these have had a marked impact on old alliances and new regional realignments. Regarding threat perception, American leaders view the terrorist menace as real, pervasive, and constant. The “inner-EU” tend to view the threat as manageable, through a mix of diplomacy, law enforcement, and UN resolutions. President Bush has frequently underscored to the American public that mass terrorism could strike at any time and an open society like the United States is constantly exposed to attack.

Even with the development of a capable U.S. Homeland Defense, through better intelligence gathering, interception, and law enforcement, Washington simply cannot guarantee that a terror cell will not strike again on American soil. Indeed, in recent days the administration has announced that the threat level in the United States is extremely high, based on credible intelligence reports, and it is likely to increase during the Iraqi campaign. The constant terrorist threat is believed to be international and interlinked, regardless of ideological and programmatic differences between particular terror networks. It is aimed against American interests anywhere on the planet and therefore must be resolutely combated wherever it exists, regardless of state borders. Hence, the planned offensive against Iraq.

The French Disconnection

The Franco-Germans and other opponents of the coming war contend that the Iraq crisis simply distracts attention from the campaign against Al-Qaeda. They also calculate that a strike against Baghdad will actually radicalize the Muslim world and increase the likelihood and opportunities for anti-Western terrorism. Bush officials argue the opposite. They point out that even if Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden do not directly collaborate, their activities serve to promote each other’s interests and goals. By eradicating the Saddam regime, a severe blow will be struck against international terrorism and its supporters while the chances that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be acquired by terrorists will substantially lessen. Ultimately, the enemy only understands force and determination and not compromise and indecision: they don’t have to like America but they must respect it.

With regard to threat preemption, the Bush administration is determined to do everything feasible to stymie and disrupt terrorist networks and their destructive plans. Hence, a primary strategic objective is to prevent terrorists from gaining dangerous biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and to eliminate dictators who arm, fund, train, and assist terror cells or who may be prepared to do so in the future. Woven into this picture is Washington’s determination to prevent any one power from dominating the Middle East, threatening America’s allies, and controlling oil supplies – the lifeblood of Western industry and commerce. West European critics, who claim that the coming war with Iraq is actually over American control of energy sources, are being deviously hypocritical.

The EU economies are in fact far more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the United States. But their leaders fail to understand that if Saddam eventually controls the Gulf than the economic pain in Europe could become profound. American resources and lives may once again serve to rescue the West European economies from the shortsightedness of their leaders. Brussels also seems ignorant of the symbolic and practical necessity of the counter-terrorist momentum. Washington cannot be seen to be wavering or indecisive in the ongoing war. Any lack of focus or determination could be demoralizing for the American public and encouraging for the terrorists who will perceive weakness and complacency as a clear demonstration of the imminent collapse of the corrupt and “soft West.”

While America focuses on disarming dictators, President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder have pledged to intensify their cooperation against American “unilateralism.” In the most ominous example of Franco-German resistance, NATO has been unable to approve Washington’s request for military planning in the event of an Iraqi war, particularly to protect Turkey – the only Alliance member bordering Iraq. Although Washington and Ankara will plan such a defense regardless of NATO, the effect on Alliance morale, trust, and unity will be devastating.

If the opposition of two core NATO members were to intensify on the eve of the war and public anti-Americanism were to escalate in Western Europe during its duration, then the already existing rifts, over such contentious issues as military burden-sharing and war capabilities, could rapidly accelerate and permanently damage NATO. Aside from Iraq, American officials continue to monitor the progress of the Allied campaign against international terrorism. Policy makers and defense planners are critical about continental European participation in the military aspects of the ongoing offensive. The campaign in Afghanistan was largely an Anglo-American affair, while other conflict zones such as Iraq are unlikely to elicit any significant military assistance from the West European allies. A planned “NATO Response Force,” scheduled to consist of 20,000 rapidly deployable troops, was approved at the recent Prague summit. However, it seems unlikely that NATO as a coherent Alliance can be rapidly adapted to fight any new wars without greater defense spending, modernization, specialization, and above all without firm political commitment. Instead, a permanent division of labor is emerging between American war fighting and European peace-keeping.

Paris-Berlin have evidently learned precious little from a decade of failed diplomacy in the Balkans. The appeasing of Milosevic simply guaranteed massacres, wars, and eventual American military intervention. In the case of Iraq, Chirac and Shroeder are playing with diplomacy yet again by calling for a long extension of the mandate for arms inspectors and for the entry of United Nations peacekeepers in order to forestall any U.S. military offensive. This is perceived as a stab in the back by the White House which remains quickly determined to oust Saddam Hussein from power and thwart his regional ambitions.

Germany, which currently holds the presidency of the UN Security Council has asserted that it will oppose a UN resolution in support of military action in Iraq, while France could use its veto to block the United States. If this threat materializes, it will guarantee that the UN is bypassed by Washington while provoking even more bitter recriminations across the Atlantic.

France and Germany are engaged in a potentially dangerous ploy, in which they will be increasingly excluded from American decision-making. Aggrieved Americans argue that the US has invested vast resources over the past half century in the defense of Western Europe and it may be time to shift the burden for self-defense on to the Europeans themselves as American resources and forces are needed elsewhere. Indeed, it may be time to let NATO itself whither and to forge partnerships with new and more dependable allies and even create a new security organization that is more global and coherent.

Chirac and Schroeder are intent on establishing a new center in European politics, a development that will concern both the US and other EU members, particularly Britain. The new Franco-German relationship is supposed to include regular joint cabinet meetings, a united front on foreign policy in international organizations such as the UN, and proposals for the EU to adopt a common security and defense policy. Paris and Berlin also recently agreed to support the creation of an EU dual presidency. The Franco-German axis evidently expects the other Europeans to march in step.

The New Europe

French and German maneuvers are seen by the smaller EU and NATO states as attempts to establish continental hegemony and they are likely to be resisted. The smaller West Europeans are gaining new like-minded allies in the East who are not only concerned about Franco-German domination but even more by the deliberate exclusion of America from the continent. As Russia lines up with Berlin and Paris, the anxiety level in Warsaw, Vilnius, Budapest, and Bucharest will accelerate. Moscow is enjoying the bonanza that Iraq has brought. It gives President Putin an opportunity to exploit and widen the trans-Atlantic rift, bypass the awkward former East European satellites by dealing directly with the “inner EU,” and gain increasing export revenues as the price of crude oil soars on the eve of the war. In particular, Moscow must be relishing the NATO divide, the impotence of the Europeans, and the frustration of Americans.

In a pointed indication of the growing NATO schism, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed Franco-German opposition to American policy over Iraq as the position of “old Europe.” There are many more countries in Europe, according to Rumsfeld, who supported America in its struggle against international terrorism and “rogue regimes.” He was alluding to several East European states already in NATO and those recently invited to join the Alliance. In Rumsfeld’s words, “if you look at Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east.”

Although at present the military role of the new European democracies is small, Washington is banking on developing their potential and capabilities over the coming decade. In combination with Britain and the southern Europeans, they could eventually form a significant counterweight to French and German pacifism and appeasement. Hence, the recent purchase by Poland of a fleet of American F-16 fighter jets is not only beneficial for business, it is also good politics and a long-term strategic calculation by the White House. The East Europeans are operating on two core principles – to keep NATO united and effective and to maintain American involvement in Europe. Even if the former fails, the latter must succeed to help ensure their own security. The obvious fear is that if France, Germany or Belgium can block Alliance planning for assistance to a long-standing NATO ally such as Turkey (and disregard NATO’s sacrosanct Article 5) then the reaction to a potential Russian threat to Estonia, Lithuania, or Poland would certainly prove even more timid

Eastern Europe’s EU aspirants are also outraged by the chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Elmar Brok, who claimed that several candidate countries had prematurely rallied to the U.S. position in the Iraqi crisis, and by disregarding EU positions they could ultimately endanger their accession into the Union. While the hypocrites in Brussels accuse Washington of bullying tactics, they themselves are directly threatening their smaller neighbors.

Former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who chairs the EU Convention on the future of Europe, warned that the Maastricht treaty calls for EU member countries to support without reservation the EU’s joint foreign policy. The problem is that there is no joint EU position on Iraq. Moreover, several large Western European states, including Britain, Italy, and Spain oppose the Franco-German position. The European Parliament has called for a special EU summit to work out a joint position for members and candidate countries, but this could result in even deeper splits in the Union assuming that the pro-American countries are allowed to participate.

Post-NATO Realities

Both NATO and the EU face some critical tests in the months ahead. The Union will be riven by disputes that will surely block the emergence of a common foreign and security policy. The upcoming Greek-sponsored EU Summit could prove a major embarrassment to European unity and accelerate both the trans-Atlantic and the intra-European divisions. A foreign and security policy that is largely designed by Paris and Berlin is a clear and present danger for EU members most at risk from domestic and foreign threats or eager to work closely with the United States. The East Europeans in particular know very well that when it comes to effective military action it is not French or German troops that will come to their rescue. NATO itself is becoming largely irrelevant for US policy, not only in terms of military capabilities and performance but even in terms of collective political and diplomatic support. If the French and Germans continue to block America in the UN and in NATO then a different sort of trans-Atlantic Alliance will emerge in the years ahead, one that largely bypasses some of the continent’s “older states.”

In such a scenario, the East Europeans will assume a more important strategic and tactical role—not in choosing between Europe and America (as some in Brussels have implied) but in protecting Europe by maintaining America engaged in the “old continent.” The Franco-German axis seems to be genuinely unaware that their posture could make the “inner-EU” increasingly superfluous to global developments. If Washington sees only obstruction, criticism, and uncooperativeness in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels, then it will redirect its resources and refocus its interests on like-minded allies elsewhere in Europe and Asia.

Some senior American politicians are calling for retaliation against Germany and France for their failure to support US policy in Iraq. In particular, there is a growing momentum for reducing the number of American troops in Germany. Whether true or not, recent rumors that Washington may be planning to move its military bases from Germany to Poland indicate that many of the old allies are no longer viewed as dependable. Logically, America would also be well advised to shed its illusions about any effective “strategic partnership” with an opportunistic Russia.

We are entering a turbulent era in trans-Atlantic relations that may drastically reshape the strategic map of Europe. While NATO may not disappear from the scene, it could increasingly either resemble the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) or a mini-UN. Alternatively, in addition to promoting stronger bilateral ties with like-minded Allies, Washington may seek a revamped “post-NATO” or a “New NATO” structure that excludes its persistent critics and opponents.