The American campaign against the Iraqi regime is merely the spark for a major power struggle over world leadership and the future of the transatlantic alliance. The long-term outcome of this struggle will have important repercussions for the enlarging Europe, for relations between the old and new democracies, and for Russia’s global ambitions. It seems certain that the coming war against Baghdad, scheduled for mid-March, will be primarily an American and British offensive with no French or other direct Allied participation. Indeed, the term “ally” may need to be reclarified, reformulated or replaced in the wake of the war. It also appears likely that the United Nations Security Council, in likely opposing setting a deadline for war against Baghdad, will eventually be ignored by Washington. US-UN relations could then descend into a long deep freeze while several new struggles develop for Europe and America alike.

The American campaign against Iraq will have important consequences for the enlargement of Europe, and in the relations between the old and new democracies and Russian global ambitions: relations between the US and UN could cool off, NATO could be left without a purpose and the cooperative nations of Eastern Europe could receive more benefits from America than from the European Union.America vs. the United Nations

Seasoned diplomats and policy makers fear that the credibility and role of the UN will seriously diminish during and after the Iraqi war. This may engender international chaos as American action could set a precedent for future unilateral moves that disregard the UN “world order.” Unless of course all the UN Security Council members make a concerted effort to restore trust and credibility in the world body and do not further estrange the United States by declaring the war as illegitimate. Such a task will prove an uphill struggle as several voices in the Bush White House and in the Pentagon would prefer to see the UN assigned to irrelevance. They contend that the UN Security Council simply puts constraints on American action, encourages “rogue regimes” to act with impunity, and ultimately endangers the nation’s security.

If such opinions prevail, then other UN resolutions will be seen in Washington as largely hollow declarations with little authority or impact. Simultaneously, if anti-American sentiments grow around the world and some governments try to exploit this to their advantage, then the US could become even more isolated and unilateralist in its actions. But a great deal also depends on the outcome of the Iraqi war. If the American-led offensive against the Saddam regime proves to be swift and successful, with a minimum loss of US and civilian lives, then the wounds inflicted by some West Europeans may not prove as painful and durable. But if the war drags on for weeks or even months with substantial American casualties, amidst growing criticism and blockage from France and other UN members, there will be serious and permanent implications for all international institutions, including the UN and NATO.

The longer-term plan for the Bush administration is to reshape the Middle East and to eliminate other threatening leaders and regimes, whether in Iran or Syria. This policy sends shivers up the spines of Arab leaders, as well as among UN Security Council members, because it is based on a calculation that America is prepared to use its power to challenge the legitimacy of UN members state. The Iraqi precedent could dramatically launch a new unstable and unpredictable era in international relations.

Even if the UN continues to function, with or without substantial American engagement, Germany’s left-Green leaders have probably wasted Berlin’s lengthy efforts to secure a permanent seat on the Security Council. Such a move will be blocked by Washington. The United States itself may continue to support the UN but in a much weakened form, while it is poised to wield its own veto power to obstruct French and Russian initiatives that it deems inappropriate.
America vs. Old Europe

The White House has lost all semblance of trust in the French and German governments. But there is one major difference between the two capitals. In Germany, unlike the Social Democratic government, the German Christian Democratic opposition is largely Atlanticist in orientation. In stark contrast, in France all the major political parties are fundamentally anti-American. Government changes in Paris make little difference to policy and the conflict with America over Iraq will serve to sharpen their attitudes. There is a clear long-term French aim to limit if not eliminate American influences from the European mainland.

The depth of anger in Washington against Paris is immense and growing by the day. Policy makers believe that President Jacques Chiraq’s objective is to diminish America’s room for maneuver on the international stage and to pose as a global counterpart with new “allies” such as Russia. This can directly threaten US security and endanger its citizens because intra-Western conflicts are perceived by terrorist regimes as evidence of Western weakness.

There is already discussion about American political counter-measures against France. This could involve a number of steps, such as excluding France from participating in decision making in various regional conflicts, blocking French initiatives by US representatives in several international bodies, and even scaling back the US embassy presence in Paris. America may even push for France’s exclusion from the North Atlantic Alliance, or at the very least Washington may promote a new structure of decision-making that would ensure the prevention of a French veto. Alternatively, a new NATO structure may be proposed by the White House in which each participant undertakes firm military commitments to participate in the anti-terror campaign. Regardless of the exact formula, NATO will undergo a major surgical operation in the coming years.

Old Europe vs. New Europe

Unable to act consistently or effectively against American interests and global predominance, France in turn may seek to extract revenge against some of the Central and East European governments for publicly siding with Washington during the current crisis. It will thereby attempt to pre-empt their support for Washington in the future. For instance, problems and delays can be envisaged with regard to European Union accession for several candidate states. Instead of retracting the Chirac attack on the sovereignty of the new democracies, Paris, Berlin, and Brussels seem to have dug in their heals. They may plan to deliberately prolong the ratification process in national parliaments for both NATO and EU accession. And new political criteria for membership may be introduced alongside the already stringent economic stipulations for Union entry.

Any delays or difficulties in bringing seven invited countries into NATO will further exacerbate existing frictions between Paris and Washington and hasten the demise of the Alliance in its present form. Indeed, the United States may go as far as offering the East European bilateral and direct security guarantees and thereby bypass NATO altogether. This could be the first step in building a new trans-Atlantic structure.

The “old” Europeans are also increasingly dealing directly with Russia over the heads of Moscow’s former colonies. As an example, on a visit to Moscow in February Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder endorsed, without even bothering to elicit EU consensus, President Putin’s proposal to create a 15+1 mechanism as a first step toward inclusion of Russia in EU decision-making. Such moves will contribute to undermining East European support for EU entry and push the new democracies even closer to the United States.

The conflict within NATO and the incapabilities of the EU member states also demonstrates that the much trumpeted European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is dead in the water. London, Madrid, Rome, and other capitals are loathed to surrender any part of their foreign policy to the Brussels bureaucracy. They point to the recent unilateralist moves by Paris and Berlin, claiming to speak on behalf of the Union, as evidence that the proposed European security system simply will not work. In many respects, France has already killed the EU as a cohesive world power.

Russia vs. United States

President Vladimir Putin has regularly called for the international containment of the American superpower. Because he is not answerable to public opinion, Putin enjoys total strategic and tactical flexibility. Russia’s current goal is to prolong the Iraqi crisis by forestalling U.S. action, while exploiting the stalemate to Russia’s advantage. Moscow is working with other states to constrain U.S. actions. It simultaneously seeks to leverage those international constraints to gain various benefits, concessions, and rewards for future Russian “consent” to American military intervention. These are the Kremlin’s tactics: a form of political judo in which Putin himself is the black belt. Strategically, Moscow’s goal is to use any benefits accruing from the Iraqi crisis to undermine the long-range interests of the United States in Europe, the Middle East, and other key regions, while incrementally strengthening Russia’s influence at American expense.

Putin does not want to abandon his post-September 11th relationship with Washington by open and prolonged conflict Instead, through stealth he wants to weaken the U.S. position and extract future concessions to Russia’s advantage. Among the prizes Moscow expects are greater access to international trade and investments, an energy partnership, and American support in future counter-terrorism efforts on behalf of the Russian Federation. The strategic objective is to transform the “unipolar” international system into a “multipolar” one, in which Russia can encourage and play off other power centers against Washington, especially the Europeans and Chinese. Indeed, during his recent visit to Paris, Putin described the Iraqi conflict as a major opportunity for reshaping the international system from “unipolarity” to “multipolarity,” thus reinvigorating the doctrine that prevailed in Moscow under Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov before September 11th.

Moscow’s top priority is both to contain the United States and to benefit from its strength, resources, and influence. The plan includes promoting divisions within the West, sidelining NATO, curtailing America’s European engagement, and buttressing Russia’s role in European affairs, while reserving Russia’s option for tactical deals with the White House. In order to gain Russian acquiescence during the imminent Iraqi war, American officials have offered to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment and give Russia MFN (Most Favored Nation) trading status on a permanent basis. They also support facilitating Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and encouraging a post-Saddam regime in Iraq to repay some of Baghdad’s multibillion-dollar debts to Moscow.

But the Kremlin is bargaining for even greater concessions, including a major share in Iraqi oil projects, massive Russian contracts in the post-conflict reconstruction, and a major role for Moscow in the political makeup of post-Saddam Iraq. Beyond Iraq, Putin is pushing for a Russian monopoly on the transit of Caspian oil and gas, a time limit on the American military presence in Central Asia, the creation of a Russia-controlled military bloc in the region, and Western tolerance for Moscow’s moves to bring Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova under firmer Kremlin control. Putin is also seeking approval to engage in “anti-terrorism” offensives in Georgia and other former Caucasian satellites.

Instead of actively participating in the anti-terror and anti-rogue regime campaign, Putin will seek rewards for passivity, non-opposition, and for not actively obstructing American-led efforts. If this strategy develops successfully, Russia would increase its stature, resources, and leverage, so that each successive bargain with Washington will extract a higher price and raise Russian power and influence vis-à-vis its neighbors. Ultimately, the goal is to rebuild Russia’s position as a Eurasian power capable of effectively challenging Western interests.
America with the New Europe

On the positive side of the struggle for global power, the new NATO members and candidates stand to benefit from the US reaction against the “core EU” countries. This could take the form of more extensive American political support, greater economic assistance, and intensified military interchanges eventually leading to the repositioning of US bases and troops currently stationed on the European mainland. Moving troops and equipment eastward would be advantageous for the Pentagon from various perspectives. The region is strategically closer to trouble spots in the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Caucasus. The eventual cost of stationing troops in Eastern Europe will be less than in Germany, while overwhelmingly pro-American feelings will make a welcome change for US soldiers and their families.

American redeployment will also provide an opportunity to significantly alter the military structure from heavy conventional forces to more operationally mobile and flexible units. The East European territories can become valuable training grounds for special operations and other non-conventional warfare. The benefits for the East Europeans are also worth underscoring. They will gain from the expansion and modernization of their infrastructure. They will acquire greater practical opportunities to become militarily interoperable with US forces. A substantial American presence will also benefit their developing economies and boost other forms of bilateral contacts.

For instance, U.S. forces can have a positive long-term impact on the Black Sea region by creating jobs in the hotel and food-producing industries, and in the development of local ports, airfields, and other military facilities. A boost to local tourism could certainly be registered. The Iraqi crisis is a test case for Washington to measure the commitments and capabilities of the new democracies. Although the White House is not asking them to choose between Paris and Washington, that may be the ultimate effect. And several countries have already passed the test not only through public declarations but also by concrete measures such as opening up air space, ground passage, and port facilities. These include Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland.

Unfortunately, Croatia’s delay in making a decision on U.S. requests for assistance, on the pretext of “consulting with our partners in the European Union,” does not boost Zagreb’s prestige in Washington. The US is seeking the availability of Croatian airspace, refueling rights, and use of Croatian bases for emergency landings in the event of a war in Iraq. Beyond Iraq, several states have been consulted on possible future US troop deployments, including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Although NATO promised to Russia that it would not position its forces in the new member states, US troops and bases may not be deployed under a NATO mandate. And even if they were, the White House may be less concerned about Russian sensitivities in the wake of the Iraqi crisis.
Future Alliances and Wars

In the coming months, Washington will look more closely at several UN and EU led initiatives in regions such as the Balkans. And its support could turn to skepticism if not outright opposition to the current UN and EU mandates. The two most glaring examples are the Serbia-Montenegro union and the UN mission in Kosovo. Instead of abandoning the Albanians and Montenegrins to the whims of the EU and the UN, Washington could be encouraged to better assist these potential allies and support their drive for independence regardless of the Brussels bureaucracy and the postures of the UN Security Council. Policy makers may calculate that the greater number of new states in Eastern Europe, the more potential allies for the United States. With the outcome of the peace rather than the coming war in doubt, the new democracies must closely monitor the US mood and respond accordingly to gain maximum advantage for themselves. They will need to calmly and coldly calculate the costs and benefits of either partnership or estrangement from the US.

Moreover, they will need to soberly reconsider where their ties with America will position them in their relations with Brussels, Paris, and Berlin. Emotionalism aside, their intra-European relations are likely to prove more troublesome and conflictive in almost every domain. But they can also enhance their position by strengthening their bilateral ties with the pro-American West European capitals. One thing seems certain: the White House will have much less respect for the views and positions of “old Europe” and this should provide a valuable lever for the “new Europeans.”