With the return to power of the Croatian Democratic Union, the country faces some major international tests. Washington and Brussels will be closely tracking the policies and progress of a party neither wanted to see back in office but will now have to accommodate. The overarching question is whether HDZ will steer Croatia toward international integration or isolation.

Some alarmists in the U.S. are warning about a new wave of ultra-nationalism throughout the post-Yugoslav space, pointing not only to the HDZ victory but also to the growth in public support for the Radicals in Serbia and persistent militancy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo. But upon closer inspection, these warnings are exaggerated.

First, Croatia and Serbia have diverged considerably since their last elections. While Serbia still wrestles with the size of its territory, Croatia is no longer preoccupied with ensuring national integrity and guarding against internal and external threats. While Serbia cannot be fully integrated into the European Union (EU) or NATO until its final status and relations with Montenegro and Kosovo are permanently settled, Croatia’s progress toward both institutions depends above all on its political performance and reformist credentials.

Second, HDZ is emerging from the dark shadow of Tudjmanism. The party has had four years to adapt and evolve and some progress has clearly been registered, although it has not fully metamorphosized into a conservative Christian Democratic formation. Much of the party faith still harbors unrealistic nationalist visions. Nevertheless, the leadership appears committed to normality and integration and HDZ’s spell in government may further develop its democratic conservative credentials.

And third, Croatia is now experiencing the political pendulum swings that characterize much of Central and Eastern Europe: from center-right to center-left, and back again. But for politics to be both constructively competitive and reasonably stable, and for reforms to be effective, the pendulum should never swing too far either way.

As in other post-communist states, large sectors of the Croatian public were disillusioned with the outgoing government, partly out of overblown expectations and partly because the Social Democrats did not implement all the reachable objectives. The HDZ-led coalition now has an opportunity to perform and deliver.

A rotation of power in Croatia is a healthy process and from the moment HDZ takes office, it too will be subject to public scrutiny and criticism and its election promises will be closely monitored. The new government has a voluminous domestic agenda and its avowed economic policies will encounter the harsh realities of market competition, budgetary discipline, continuing official corruption and cronyism, and potential social protests.

Moreover, with the new authorities in Zagreb committed to EU integration, a vast array of legislation and other reforms require implementation over the coming years. But before Croatia joins the laborious EU accession process it will need to fulfill some preliminary criteria, above all full cooperation with The Hague war crimes tribunal and full compliance on the return of Serbian refugees.

And this is where “the rubber will hit the road” as the new government will be expected to apprehend and extradite General Ante Gotovina, whatever the merits of his indictment, and to more fully support the broader Hague investigation process. Paradoxically, HDZ may be able to deliver to The Hague much more effectively than the social democrats and it can work with Washington to review the charges of “command responsibility.” It will be more difficult for the rightist constituency to protest against their own party, although some ultras will no doubt charge national betrayal and seek to spark social unrest.

But the bigger question is whether HDZ will make different choices in its approach toward Europe and America. Croatia must find ways to more effectively promote its national interests both as a prospective EU and NATO member and as an ally of the United States. Such a long-term goal will not be easy to accomplish given the strained and conflictive state of trans-Atlantic relations and the contradictory pressures exerted toward Zagreb and other Central-East European capitals from both the EU and the US.

A spokesman for EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten has stated that the Union seeks to work with Croatia on a “pro-EU, pro-reform agenda.” Only after some results are registered will Brussels issue any promise for Zagreb’s admittance by 2007. The new government must work hard to gain such a pledge by May next year when seven Central European and Baltic states will be formally admitted into the Union.

Ambiguity and delay are not effective recipes for international success. The weaker the country, the more conflictive its internal politics, the less cooperative its government internationally, and the more negative are outside perceptions, the more likely that Zagreb will be pressured to make choices between the two Atlantic powers and it will feel squeezed between both.

Croatia does not need to choose between Europe and America. It can pursue EU membership as an ally of the United States and it can strengthen its alliance with the U.S. as an effective future member of the EU. This does not mean endorsing every policy that Washington or Brussels adopt, but it does mean that once an important political decision is taken, Zagreb must fulfill its commitments, whether by participating in US-led security missions or in meeting its stipulated reform requirements.

At present, Washington is carefully eyeing the preliminary moves of the new authorities and has mixed feelings on HDZ’s election success. On the one hand, the rightist forces may be more accommodating on issues important for the White House that conflict with EU policy, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). On the other hand, if HDZ brings its nationalist baggage back into politics, the U.S. will have to adopt a harder position.

HDZ can better position the country for NATO membership but it needs to meet some short and long-range criteria. In the short-term, Zagreb can fulfill conditions for Partnership for Peace (PfP) in terms of completing basic civil-military reforms. It can also offer to make appropriate contributions to NATO’s ongoing transformation and underscore that the undercutting of NATO’s effectiveness and America’s engagement by an emerging EU security and foreign policy will be counter-productive and destabilizing. Croatia must also more actively participate in the multi-pronged struggle against terrorists and other international criminal networks.

HDZ leader Ivo Sanader has asserted that the party is committed to resolving all open questions with neighbors and fully normalizing bilateral relations. One instructive foreign policy test will be Zagreb’s evolving regional ties. Gone are the dreams of a Greater Croatia and a division of the territorial spoils of Yugoslavia with Belgrade. In the modern era, regional relations are expected to be based on collaboration in issues ranging from trade and infrastructure to crime fighting and counter-terrorism.

Any outstanding local disputes need to be swiftly resolved even if this involves outside mediation. The fracas with Slovenia over access to the Adriatic is a valuable litmus test for the new administration and cannot be allowed to continue; otherwise Zagreb will soon have a territorial dispute with an EU member.

In Bosnia-Hercegovina, HDZ can make a significant contribution in finally burying the idea of Croatian separatism and encouraging a joint military and security structure that will help stabilize its insecure neighbor. In this way, Bosnia can also move into NATO’s PfP, make progress on its interoperability with NATO, and undergo statewide reforms that will be beneficial to all of its neighbors.

Serbia and Montenegro can also be valuable partners for Croatia. Under the previous government relations steadily improved, but Serbian politics remain in a state of flux. HDZ can accelerate the process of reconciliation with Belgrade and maintain cooperative relations with both Belgrade and Podgorica when the temporary Union splits in 2005. Whatever the outcome of the Serbian elections at the end of December, there is little chance for revisionist claims to nearby territories.

Zagreb also has an opportunity to flesh out the US-Adriatic Charter. The initiative demonstrates to participating states that regardless of EU policies America is committed to the security of the region and is seeking ways to engender cross-border cooperation especially in the security arena. However, it is largely up to the Adriatic countries to propose and implement specific initiatives.

Above all, confidence building measures can be developed through cross-border programs such as joint military exercises, inter-military exchanges, and information sharing that evolves into intelligence cooperation and joint operations. Such collaboration, together with American involvement and increasing military and technical interoperability, can lay the groundwork for NATO membership for each state.

Adriatic neighbors should also plan the creation of a multi-national peace-keeping battalion similar to the successful three-nation Baltic example that has been employed in various trouble spots. Such collaborative regional initiatives will impress and encourage American policy makers as locals take greater responsibility for their security and that of others.

In addition to inter-military cooperation, other pressing challenges must be handled across borders. Programs to strengthen police structures, improve border security, and implement the rule of law are critical to better handle the struggle against organized crime, illegal migration, and human trafficking. The growing links between criminality, armed militants, and terrorism will require greater regional collaboration and intensive cooperation with both Washington and Brussels.

The new HDZ authorities must not be prejudged, but should be given the opportunity to implement a heavy domestic and foreign agenda. And on questions of vital national interests, all sensible political forces need to be united so that Croatia can catch up with its northern neighbors in assuming its rightful place in the two most important international institutions.