With Croatia poised for exclusion from EU accession talks, speculation is mounting that the majority of West European states simply do not want Zagreb in the club. While optimists believe that the current crisis over the Hague Tribunal is only a temporary aberration, pessimists are convinced that Croatia will not enter the EU until Serbia is ready for membership. And there may be elements of truth in both suppositions.

Most EU states, led by Britain, are firmly opposed to starting entry talks with Croatia on 17 March, supposedly due to Zagreb’s lack of effort in apprehending war crimes indictee General Ante Gotovina. A small group of Croatia’s neighbors, including Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Italy, are in favor of launching the talks but the process will require unanimity. The final decision will be taken on the eve of the deadline by EU foreign ministers.

Chief UN prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has delivered a scathing report against Zagreb, claiming that it was not providing full cooperation with the ICTY. The government has strenuously denied such assertions, but it is difficult to determine the accuracy of its denials. Is it in Zagreb’s interest to shield Gotovina or to move forward toward Brussels? Is the government more concerned about losing public support by surrendering Gotovina or in retarding the country’s future by ignoring the EU?

Regardless of what one thinks about Gotovina’s role in Croatia’s war of independence, if he is the patriot that so many claim then he should surrender himself voluntarily to the tribunal and not behave like the two most prominent cowards, Karadzic and Mladic. The voluntary surrender to the ICTY by Ramush Haradinaj, the Prime Minister of Kosova, amply demonstrates that the fate of one’s country should take precedence over one’s personal welfare.

Indeed, the trial of Gotovina will present an opportunity for the defendant to clear his name and to draw distinctions between his role and that of his Serbian counterparts. Tragically, most wars are marred by atrocities against innocent civilians, but the question remains: was the massacre of Serbian non-combatants condoned or even ordered by Croatian commanders, or was it the act of sadistic individuals who have not been punished.

The optimists believe that we are merely witnessing a temporary delay in EU negotiations while Gotovina is tracked down or surrenders. But there is a murkier side to this picture that should not be dismissed and the Gotovina case may not be the last demand on Zagreb. It has been evident for several years that Croatia continues to be held back from international institutions by some EU and US officials. The EU’s decision to grudgingly give Zagreb a green light for entry talks was reportedly opposed in London, Washington, and other capitals.

Some policy makers calculate that the only way to drag Serbia toward European standards is by equalizing the two major powers that emerged from Yugoslavia. By depicting Croatia as an aggressor in the 1991-1995 wars, Serbia’s primary responsibility can be reduced and its elites will allegedly feel less victimized by international bodies. By raising the standards that Croatia has to meet for both EU and NATO entry, Belgrade’s consistently poor performance can be relativized. By including Croatia in a broader regional package, Serbia will supposedly feel less isolated and will not respond spitefully and aggressively.

Unfortunately, such calculations are wrong-headed and counter-productive: they will neither raise Croatia nor satisfy Serbia. If they are implemented, then both countries will become isolated from the European mainstream and the entire region will suffer. Croatia’s neighbors are understandably anxious that their own interests will be undermined if Croatia is excluded from the EU as nationalism and isolationism are likely to grow, foreign investment could dry up, the economy may stagnate, and emigration will increase.

President Stipe Mesic has warned that Croatia could undergo a rise in anti-European sentiment if the country does not enter the Union in 2007, alongside Romania and Bulgaria. Public support for EU accession is evidently declining and the Sanader government could collapse if it fails to deliver on its European promise. In this respect, EU policy could become a self-fulfilling prophecy if Croatia lurches toward radicalism.

By shielding Serbia from reality and denying progress to a Croatia committed to Europe, equalization will further delay regional democratization, modernization, and integration. And Serbia will have even less reason to reform and to discard its territorial ambitions in Kosova, Montenegro, and Bosnia, as the spotlight can always be shifted elsewhere.

The EU presidency is likely to submit a new proposal and timetable for starting accession talks with Zagreb. But any long delay or indefinite postponement will send a negative signal for the entire Adriatic region. Contrary to the arguments of short-sighted policy makers, such a scenario is certain to escalate conflicts between Zagreb and Belgrade, because Croatia will be widely perceived as Serbia’s international hostage.