Representatives of the Belgrade government continue to claim that they have no knowledge of the whereabouts of former commander of the Army of Republika Srpska, Ratko Mladic, who was indicted for war crimes before the Hague Tribunal. However, the main problem of the government in Belgrade is that no one believes them, which could soon negatively reflect on Serbia's wishes in upcoming talks on the future status of Kosovo, rapprochement to the European Union, Partnership for Peace, cooperation with international financial organizations and the position of the international community on the separation of Montenegro from Serbia.

Why doesn't the world believe Belgrade? Perhaps because the documents the ICTY requested from Belgrade, which the Serbian military claim do not exist, still happened to be used as evidence before the Tribunal, though in the hands of a defense witness in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Or perhaps because Belgrade sent the ICTY seven different versions of Mladic's file, the final version including several empty pages. It is possible that this distrust is due to the quick and multiple denials that it is not known who finances Mladic, despite being the claim of the Belgrade war crimes prosecutor. In the second half of December, there was virtually not a single day when the Serbian press did not release “reliable information” or claims from expert “analysts” or “security experts” that Mladic had been located by intercepting a telephone call or that they were closing in on him and the negotiations for his surrender were in full swing. The Serbian government has tried so hard to leave the impression of how they are working to apprehend Mladic, informing the foreign press of their New Year’s deadline. The situation appeared so serious considering that Tomislav Nikolic, Vice-president of the Serbian Radical Party, whose leader Vojislav Seselj is in The Hague awaiting trial on war crimes charges, proposed that Mladic commit suicide to avoid ending up in The Hague.

In the third week of 2006, Mladic is still a free man, and the commentary by Serbian Deputy Premier Miroljub Labus was, “It’s good news that there are no longer any deadlines, and bad news that we failed to meet all the deadlines. Cooperation with The Hague is not only about extraditing Mladic, but it is one of the most important parts. And the world has lost its patience.”

A serious sign that all patience was lost was seen in the December report by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte to the UN Security Council, in which she stated that Serbia’s cooperation with The Hague had deteriorated and that it was the Serbian army that was to blame. It was quickly reported that Belgrade had released Mladic’s file to the ICTY for the seventh time, but that the Tribunal again claimed that the file was incomplete.

The personal file should not be overly exciting to read as it primarily contains dry information on the official biography of the officer: when, where and with what grades he finished his schooling; where he served and for how long; official grades of service; orders on transfers and promotions; information on possible disciplinary action. The Serbia & Montenegro Defense Ministry claims that the Tribunal received the complete 106 page file. However, the ICTY Prosecution is convinced that there is something missing from the file which could prove the connections between the RS Army and Belgrade. The missing pages would show who signed the orders on Mladic’s promotions, transfers and retirement.

From 1991 to 1994, Mladic was exceptionally promoted three times by Belgrade, even though Serbia “did not participate in the wars in Croatia and B&H”. This connection with the RS Army does not extend exclusively to the Belgrade under the Milosevic years, but also to the current Serbian government. Namely, after being retired in 1996 by then President of RS, Biljana Plavsic, he continued to serve in the Yugoslav Army, officially as an advisor in the crisis staff, while he continued to receive his general’s salary. It took over five years for Mladic to finally be retired. That occurred in 2002, when Milosevic was already in The Hague, and the Decision on Retirement was the responsibility of Vojislav Kostunica, then President of Yugoslavia and now Serbian Premier. Perhaps this is the reason why Belgrade considers that certain documents cannot be handed over to the Tribunal, believing that such a move would jeopardize national security and the reputation of certain figures in the current government.

According to Rasim Ljajic, president of the Serbian board for Cooperation with the ICTY, the Tribunal is seeking the Decision of the Banja Luka Military Post no. 7572 from March 2002, which released Mladic from active military service, for this document was supposed to have been included in the file. They are also requesting mail correspondence from June 2002 which was allegedly signed by Mladic, thereby approving the Decision on his retirement. Without this signature, Mladic would be unable to receive his pension, which he received until two months ago. This correspondence would prove that the Yugoslav Army knew of Mladic’s whereabouts in 2002, when the government in Belgrade claims that they had lost all trace of him. Ljajic announced that the Tribunal was seeking all documents on the controls of the Yugoslav Army over Mladic – orders, instructions, tasks, promotions. The Yugoslav Army responded that they had no such documents and that they were not a part of the Mladic file. Particularly suspicious are several completely blank pages with a stamp, which Ljajic claims were archived in exactly that form in the Defense Ministry and that they had been submitted as such in order to avoid the impression that they were hiding something.

Ljajic admits that the lack of trust is the greatest problem as Belgrade “is always acting as though it has something to hide – what can be done in 2 days gets done in 20 days, and it leaves the impression that it will only do something when backed up against the wall”, and that this problem only escalated when retired General Bozidar Delic appears as a defense witness in the Milosevic trial. The ICTY had previously requested some 15 documents on the joint command of the police and army in Kosovo in 1999 during the NATO attacks. The military claimed that such a document did not exist, and that it was not in the archives. Then Milosevic’s witness Delic appeared with 2 of these 15 documents, and so the ICTY asked what was going on. The Serbia& Montenegro Army claimed that there were no such documents, and then a military official appears with the documents. Soon afterwards, the Defense Ministry submitted all 15 documents to the ICTY.

There were similar situations earlier. In February 2005, new information arose that Mladic’s long time bodyguard Branislav Puhalo had been employed in the Belgrade military base Topcide; the response from the Army was that “no man by that name worked or had ever worked in the military”. Only three days later, the Ministry commented, “Puhalo is a first class Captain employed in the 46^th Logistics Brigade in Belgrade. While employed in the RS Army, he worked in Mladic’s security team”.

With respect to Mladic’s pension, this was paid out in Belgrade until November 2005. Members of Mladic’s family and two officers of the Serbia & Montenegro Army had written permission to collect on the pension payments. This permission was to be-signed every six months, but in Mladic’s case, there was understanding for the non-signing of this document. His right to pension was frozen only following the intervention of the new Defense Minister Zoran Stankovic, due to the expiry of the six month permission period.

Just before the New Year, Vladimir Vukcevic, war crimes prosecutor of the Belgrade County Court, gave an extremely strange statement. He said that they had information, as did the police and the security agency BIA on five persons who were in communication with Mladic and former President of RS, Radovan Karadzic, also indicted for war crimes. Vukcevic sent out the message to all those aiding Mladic and Karadzic that “the time had come to stop for they would be criminally prosecuted”.

Why the prosecutor would warn those breaking the law instead of apprehending and prosecuting them is not known, but it is known that the Serbian Government immediately refuted these claims. Justice Minister Zoran Stojkovic said that he had no idea what Vukcevic was talking about, while Police Minister Dragan Jocic stated that the police had no knowledge who was financing Mladic. Rade Bulatovic, Director of the BIA, concluded that Vukcevic only wanted to warn citizens that offering aid to those indicted for war crimes was against the law. “The citizens likely do not know that by aiding the Hague indictees, they are conducting a serious felony which can result in 10 years in prison,” concluded Bulatovic as though speaking to schoolchildren.

One explanation for Vukcevic’s unusual step is that the Serbian Government suggested he speak out, and then denied his claims in order to compromise the prosecutor, for many in the government are critical that he is too involved in war crimes committed by Serbian forces in Croatia and B&H.

Serbian President Boris Tadic, whose Democratic Party is in the opposition, accused the Serbian government, saying it was responsible for the lack of complete cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and the failure to extradite Mladic. Police Minister Jocic responded that the former government, in which the Democratic Party had the main say, could have arrested Mladic as he frequently appeared in public, even at football matches. “In those three or four years that they did not want to work, the Ministers of the former government contributed to today’s situation, when it is difficult to establish the facts after a certain pause,” said Jocic.

That fact is that late Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic stated several times that he had no knowledge of Mladic’s whereabouts. Members of Djindjic’s government, now in opposition, claim that they knew Mladic was in Serbia, but the police never received an arrest warrant because “he was not under their jurisdiction” considering that he hid out in military facilities. President Tadic, then as Yugoslav Defense Minister, said that Mladic’s last contact with the military was on 21 May 2002. Now Tadic claims that the “intelligence data suggest that Mladic is hiding out in the forests around the Serbian borders”.

Last week, ICTY spokesperson Florance Hartmann stated, “They never even tried to arrest Mladic. When the Serbian public discussed his arrest, the services only invited him to tea. Mladic could be in The Hague in 48 hours. But there is no political will and the state organs are not working towards this. Mladic is in Serbia. And he is not hiding in the forests, but in buildings under the protection of part of military intelligence”.

Last week’s formation of a National Security Council says a lot about the importance the Serbian government is giving to the arrest of Mladic in relation to internal political conflicts. This body is composed of the Serbian President and Premier, Police, Foreign and Defense Ministers, heads of the intelligence agencies and the Chief of the Crisis Staff. The National Council was formed to address issues concerning the Hague Tribunal as well as other exceptional situations. But not longer after the Serbian government announced the decision to form this Council, with the President and Premier to jointly call its sessions, Boris Tadic requested that this decision be reconsidered.

Tadic assessed that the government was not truly interested in the function of the National Security Council, that this body had been established for marketing reasons and that the current solution did not consider the authority of the Serbian President. As his Office claims, Tadic proposed that the model from Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and the Ukraine be used for the formation of this Council, but he did not receive a response. However, the government says that they agreed to all the details with Tadic two months ago and that he and Premier Kostunica would alternate the Chairman position in the Council sessions.

“In the meantime, Tadic reconsidered and requested that he be the sole Chairman, calling upon the Croatian model. However, in Croatia, presidential authorities are tied to the security agencies, which is not the case in Serbia. Here, the government has the authority to form such a Council,” claims Kostunica’s office.

And while similar discussions are ongoing, the first consequences have appeared. The US Congress has decided to cut its $75m aid to Serbia unless Mladic and Karadzic are in The Hague by 31 May 2006. Meanwhile, warnings are increasingly that the EU has the right to cut off all talks with Belgrade on the Stabilization and Association Agreement, scheduled for next month.