Franjo Tuđman i Gojko ŠušakThe indictment of the Hague Prosecution against three Croatian Generals, Ante Gotovina, Mladen Markac and Ivan Cermak, has at its disposal much more comprehensive evidence than was previously thought. This refers not only to their quantity, but also to their credibility and strength. The basis of the indictment against the Croatian generals is 17 transcripts drawn up in the office of former President Franjo Tudjman. In the opinion of the Hague Prosecution these transcripts prove that there was a plan for the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from the area of the self-proclaimed "Republika Srpska Krajina", which was backed by Croatia's political and military leadership. Up to now it had been thought that the transcript of Tudjman's meeting with top military and political officials of 31 July 1995 on the Brijuni islands was the only key proof which the Hague Prosecution had at its disposal against the Croatian generals.

The Prosecution, however, has managed to acquire a series of other significant transcripts according to which the plan to drive Serbs out of Croatia was initiated as far back as 1992 in line with Tudjman's idea of the "humane" resettlement of the population, which is confirmed from a number of his other statements, and the statements of his closest associates in the period from 1992 to 1996.


Nacional has gained insight into a summary of the 44-page Hague Prosecution indictment against Croatian Generals Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, in which the Prosecution gives an overview of the material with which it will try to prove the responsibility of the three generals for crimes against the Serbian population prior to, during and after Operation Storm, in the period from July and September of 1995, and in a 16-page supplement with various annexes which list Serbian civilian victims. These crimes, according to the Prosecution, were carried out in an ethnic cleansing that was conceived as part of a joint criminal enterprise.

Croatia and the indicted generals will be hard put to debunk the Hague Prosecution's contention of a joint criminal enterprise which, if proven, could have far reaching negative consequences for Croatia's international position, but also for its near and distant future. If the contention of the existence of a criminal organisation that planned out the expulsion of Serbs from the occupied territories is not refuted, the indicted Croatian generals will not be able to defend themselves. In order to prove the existence of such an organisation, the Hague Prosecution, in its indictment, starts from Tudjman's Brijuni islands meeting with top military and political leaders, at which a decision was made for an assault against the self-proclaimed "Republic of the Serbian Krajina" and in the very introduction of the argumentation of the existence of a criminal enterprise it cites Tudjman's statement: "…it is important that these civilians start moving and then the army will follow them, and when the columns start moving, they will have a psychological effect on each other."

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The Prosecution also says that earlier, at that same meeting, Tudjman had pointed out: "…we need to strike in such a way that the Serbs practically have to disappear." The Prosecution has linked this statement of Tudjman's one made by Ante Gotovina at the same meeting: "A large number of civilians are already leaving Knin and moving towards Banja Luka and Belgrade. That means, if we continue with this kind of pressure, there is likely not to be any civilians left after a time, only those who had to stay because they did not have the possibility of leaving." The Prosecution interprets this statement of Gotovina's alleging that he on 2 August 1995 defined the nature of the mentioned "pressure" on the civilian population by issuing orders for strikes against "the towns of Drvar, Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac and Gracac with artillery fire."

Nikica ValentićIn describing the existence of a criminal enterprise the Prosecution is not concerned so much with military activity but rather interprets the enterprise with several key facts and statements made by top Croatian state officials as far back as 1992. The Prosecution feels that the goal of the expulsion of the Serbs from the Krajina area was in fact the long-term interest of President Tudjman inked to the idea of a need for ethnically homogenous nations on a given territory. Tudjman, claims the Prosecution, saw the ethnic splintering in the territory of Yugoslavia as a historical problem that could be addressed, for example, by the relocation of populations from on area to another. It was a reasonable solution for Tudjman and his closest associates, as it also was for Serbian officials, for them the relocation of the two nations was of mutual interest, claims the Prosecution. Bosnian Serb Nikola Koljevic, a top ranking official of the “Republika Srpska” of the time, in September of 1992 presented Tudjman with such a plan. Tudjman stated on 8 January 1992: "We need to be open to discussions on territorial demarcation, which is, regarded historically, acceptable, it has been demonstrated that this understanding of the problem is not only needed, but it is in the sense of the relocation of population and so forth…"

He later added: "Wherever national problems were so conceived as has been done to us, that has been addressed, from World War I and World War II, by leading to a conclusion on the relocation of populations." The Croatian leadership, claims the Prosecution, also found favour for these kinds of ethnic changes on the ground with Slobodan Milosevic. When Tudjman and his associates on 17 November 1994 discussed what to do with the Serbs in Croatia, he said that he has signed an Agreement on Voluntary Relocation with then Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and that, "if there is a mutual diplomatic recognition between Croatia and Serbia, the Serbs who did not want to live in Croatia would simply leave", reads the Prosecution's indictment.

Further, Tudjman's advisor and former Prime Minister Hrvoje Sarinic on 29 August 1995, according to the presidential transcripts, related to Tudjman a discussion with Milosevic, to whom he said: "I will tell you something that goes against my personal ethical principles, but, the sooner there are less Serbs in Croatia and less Croatians in Serbia, the better our future relations will be. An autonomous region within the Republic of Croatia would be a potential Trojan horse for Serbian policy. Milosevic said: 'What of it?' And I said, Mr. President, what will happen if we leave a situation like this one. I then told him about the 4.5 million people who relocated after World War II and I told him that we do not have to use big words like ethnic cleansing, people move in order to create a normal atmosphere in which we can carry out commerce and the like…"

In its interpretation of a criminal enterprise the Prosecution points out that the decisiveness that the Croatian territory within Croatia's borders be sufficiently Croatian is also reflected in Tudjman's rejection of some territorial concessions. Tudjman, claims the Prosecution, rejected a possible agreement according to which it had been foreseen that the Bosnian Posavina region to the north of Bosnia & Herzegovina would go to Croatia. He regarded that for the position that, if Posavina was returned to the Croatian entity, he would have to return 300,000 Croatian Serb refugees to Croatia, which he by no means wished to do.

In discussion with his associates on 18 September 1995 Tudjman added that, instead of implementing the mentioned idea, the Bosnian Croats of the Posavina area should be settled in parts of western Slavonia that Serbs had left after Operation Flash. To this effect, claims the Prosecution, goes a statement by then Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic who, after Operation Flash, said that: "The Serbian issue in western Slavonia had been addressed. There are no more than a thousand people remaining, mostly older women, and there are no more than 300-400 persons who represent any kind of political factors."

Afterwards, at a 28 September 1995 meeting with his associates, Tudjman pointed out that the global return to Croatia of Serbian refugees was unacceptable and that even the return of 150,000 Serbs could be problematic. He reminded them that 300,000 Serbs would have returned to Croatia had Croatia taken control of Posavina. Besides that, said Tudjman, the return of Serbs to Croatia would be the same as giving them Croatian territory: "Therefore, if you want the Bosnian Posavina back, just go ahead, and hand back western Slavonia, just go ahead and hand back all you taken. You have to look at the issue of the Bosnian Posavina in that context", Tudjman concluded his speech.

The Prosecution also claims that the national leadership did all that it could so that the Serbs would not return to Croatia. A directive was issued whereby the state temporarily took possession of private property saying that all those whose property had been temporarily seized had to call in within 30 days to confirm their ownership of that property.

Faced with the recent war, the fear of retaliation and a very short deadline to call in, few of the refugee Serbs opted to prove their ownership of property in Croatia, reads the Prosecutions allegations. Tudjman's advisor Hrvoje Sarinic on 30 August 1995 stated: "We should be encouraged by the way things are unfolding in western Slavonia. This is very positive for us, because no one has returned." Besides that, when Sarinic on 22 August 1995 proposed: "…we need to bring Croatians quickly into the area and colonise it and not allow at any price the return of more that 10 percent of Serbs", Tudjman's answer was clear: "Not even 10 percent."

Hrvoje ŠarinićAs far as the implementation of the criminal enterprise is concerned, the Prosecution again cites Tudjman's meeting of 31 July on the Brijuni islands with generals Gotovina, Markac, Cermak and others and in doing so maintains its contention of the shelling of civilian areas, psychological operations, systematic killing, expulsion, arson and torture. Deliberating on the Brijuni islands over the operational plan of the assault, Tudjman stated that a general offensive should cause great panic in Knin, he told those present to keep in mind how many Croatian villages and towns had been destroyed during the war and reminded them that that had not yet happened to Knin, but that the current situation provided a "very good justification for that kind of action." Gotovina told Tudjman: "Mr. President, at this moment our artillery has complete control of Knin. This is not a problem, if the order is issued to attack Knin, we will destroy it and its environs within a few hours…" Gotovina, according to the claims of the Prosecution, did just that on 2 August 1995 with his command to attack specific targets, the enemy front line, command posts, communication centres and the Serbian Army's artillery positions, and the towns of Drvar, Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac and Gracac. On his orders Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Gracac and many other places, towns and villages were attacked without break for two days, even though there was few or practically in all cases not a single military target.

In a Croatian Army intelligence report of 5 August 1995, it was confirmed that the military operations were a success: "most towns, Knin, Gracac, Plaski, Petrinja, Dubica, were under direct strikes, which caused the spontaneous or organised departure of civilians." It is clear from this, claims the Prosecution, that Gotovina had implemented what Tudjman had pointed out: "cause such an impact that the Serbs will practically disappear."

As far as psychological operations are concerned, the Prosecution cites that, besides carrying out artillery attacks against civilian areas, the Croatian side broadcast false news and dropped leaflets from the air of a false content as to how the "Government of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina" was spurring on the evacuation of civilians. Defence minister Susak at a meeting of 31 July 1995 pointed out: "We will inform them of what routes they can retreat through, but formulate it so as to cause confusion among them." At that same meeting Tudjman said: "That means we provide them with an exit, while on the other hand we feign to guarantee civilian human rights and the like…" In the chapter of the Prosecution's petition that relates to killing, arson and detention the premise is that the Croatian Army and Special Police Forces entered practically deserted towns and villages. The Serbs were divided up, the elderly and helpless to one side, the young and able-bodied on the other, during which time they were exposed to mistreatment. Individually and in cooperation, claims the Prosecution, Gotovina, Markac and Cermak led the cleansing operation with their forces.

According to the available documents, the Prosecution does not know the exact number of murdered and missing Serbs. According to Veritas, a total of 1594 Serbs were killed or went missing, including 10 children and 358 women. The Croatian government stats say that 911 Serbs were killed, half of which were civilians, with 336 civilians buried. According to the European Commission Observer’s report of 26 August 1995, a rough estimate of damaged property in the South Sector puts the figure at 60–80% of the total Serb property in that area. That report states that uniformed members of the Croatian military torched homes in areas under strict military control and control of the Croatian police. According to the claims of UN officials, the “abandoned property of every Serb” was looted.

The looting of Serbian assets and torching were systematic and organised and the prosecutor claims that numerous field reports confirm this. The same houses were looted several times, and this state lasted until October 1995. In certain cases, Serbian prisoners were required to help transport the loot to the homes of the Croatian soldiers, according to the Prosecutor’s report. This refers to units of the Special Police under the command of General Mladen Markac. In addition to participating in systematic destruction, the Special Forces units were also near to the areas where many murders occurred.

In a special chapter on other participants of the criminal enterprise, the Prosecution mentions that in addition to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, the three indicted generals, then Defence Minister Gojko Susak, Generals Janko Bobetko and Zvonimir Cervenko and others also participated.

The Prosecution plans to prove Gotovina’s responsibility for crimes in Operation Storm through testimonies of UN and EU representatives in Croatia and their documentation, as well as with the fact that Gotovina was in full control and command of the units of the Croatian army and military police. In referring to a series of military reports written by Gotovina on the movements of his units, the Prosecution believes that “Gotovina was in command of the forces that systematically torched and looted Serbian homes and during their broad attacks, including murder.” The Prosecution derived the thesis that Gotovina ordered the crimes from the fact that the crimes were committed by persons in a strict hierarchy, which could be many perpetrators, considering that the attacks were systematic and lasted for weeks. The Prosecution believes that Gotovina was aware of the criminal actions of his inferiors. The same units were distributed in Operation Storm, particularly the 4th and 7th Guard Brigades, they plundered and torched Serbian property during Operation Summer 95 from 25 to 30 July 1995 in the Knin municipality. Gotovina knew of these activities, and his records in the operative log books proves that.

The Prosecution claims that General Gotovina was fully informed of all that was going on, as the international representatives warned him from the very start of th operation as to violations of human rights, he received constant reports from his forces in the field, he himself was able to see the consequences in Knin, and the media reported on all the events. According to the Prosecution, Commander of the UN South Sector Alain Forand sent a protest message to General Gotovina on the first day of Operation Storm, warning him of attacks on civilians. After this, “Gotovoina continued shelling with the same intensity the following morning,” says the Prosecution. When asked by General Forand why he did not stop the torching and looting, Gotovina responded that he was unable to control certain units in the field and that for his men, this was a form of vengeance. Gotovina issued several orders between 4 and 18 August to stop the criminal activities and to implement disciplinary procedures, but he failed in implementing them. After two weeks of such activities, and under the threat of international sanctions, on 18 August, commander of the Military Police Mate Lausic forwarded Gotovina a letter of protect from the Embassies in Zagreb due to the conduct of Croatian soldiers in the field. A similar letter was received from Interior Minister Josko Moric the same day.

Gotovina promised to take concrete measures and call in other bodies for help, including the police. On 18 August 1995, he sent a request to Mladen Markac to assign him a company of special police under the command of the Split Combat District. He did no request that this unit be sent to bring order and discipline to the liberated areas, but to assist in the cleansing operation. Gotovina had two companies of the Military Police and the 72nd and 73rd companies under his command, the Disciplinary Court and the Military Court, but he did nothing to prevent such activities.

The Prosecution’s report states that not only did the generals work together and know about the crimes, but like Cermak, they also participated in covering up the crimes and spreading disinformation in order to deceive the international observers. This was a particular criticism in the case of murdered Serbs in the village Grubori. The Prosecution stated that only one day after the murders, Cermak visited Grubori and covered up the crime by spreading disinformation. The Prosecution plans to enter military documentation into evidence, such as the orders by General Cermak and documentation on his coordination and meetings with Generals Gotovina and Markac on 25 August 1995. Cermak is not mentioned by the prosecutor in the context of the presidential transcripts, which proves the criminal enterprise, but instead states that the three indicted generals and their forces conducted coordinated cleansing in the field.

The Prosecution claims, referring to Croatian military documentation, that as commander of the Knin garrison, Cermak had effective control over the HV units in the area and over the military police, and therefore he could have prevented crimes and punished those responsible or initiate proceedings against them. In referring to his orders, the Prosecution claims that Cermak also issued orders to the military, the military police and civil authorities. The Prosecution believes that the crimes committed by his inferiors were so obvious that Cermak had to know about them, even without the warnings from the international representatives.

Commander of the UN forces in the South Sector, General Alaine Forand also reported General Cermak, along with General Gotovina, for the looting and torching, as did several other representatives of the international forces.

The Prosecution claims that the UN and EU Observer mission complaints were passed on verbally, while Cermak also received a copy of international reports. He did nothing to resolve the issue. The Prosecution claims another example of how Cermak could have reacted immediately and that he was superior to all the units, i.e. that he had full authority to prevent the plundering, murders and torching of Serbian property, but he did not do so. General Forand complained on 9 August 1995 that the Croatian soldiers had stolen his vehicle. Cermak responded immediately. He established a joint team of members of the military and civil police to find the vehicle and submitted a report on what had been done that same day. After yet another protest by General Forand on 11 August 1995, Cermak established more police teams from Knin and the military police to find the missing vehicle. When these measures did not succeed, Cermak inform the General Staff, requesting that the stolen vehicle be returned immediately and that similar acts be prevented from happening.

With respect to General Mladen Markac, the Prosecution plans to enter special police documents and documents on his coordination of military activities with Generals Gotovina and Cermak into evidence. In the context of the presidential transcripts that prove the criminal enterprise, the Prosecution mentions Markac as a person present at the Brijuni meeting, but does not assign him a concrete role in the meeting where, according to the Prosecution, the ethnic cleansing was planned.

They claim that the three indicted generals and their forces coordinated ethnic cleansing in the field. They also claim that there is virtually no evidence from international sources such as the UN or EU Observation Mission against General Markac. The Prosecution plans to connect him not only to police activities, i.e. special police units under his command, but to the artillerty and shelling units of HV who were ranked bellowed him in operative purposes. By the decision by then HV Chief of Staff Zvonimir Cervenko, Markac was responsible for the part of Storm carried out by the special police forces.

Immediately after the special police established their staff in Gracac on 5 August 1995, at least 9 elderly Serbs were killed or disappeared from that town. Between 5 and 7 August 1995, the special police was near Kijani, where 14 Serbian civilians were killed or went missing and on 5 August, they were near the village Grab where two elderly Serbian civilians were found killed. Two days later, members of the special police entered into the village Mazin, where 7 elderly Serbian civilians were found. That same day, they entered Donji Lapac, wher 9 civilians went missing.

In Obljaj near Donji Lapac, three elderly Serbian women were killed, while that same day in Dnopolje, 3 km southwest of Donji Lapac, four elderly civilians were found. On 27 August 1995, members of the special police were in Golubic near Knin, where 4 Serbian civlians were killed that day. The Prosecution claims that Markac’s inferiors were fully informed of the events, and that he received reports from the HV intelligence structures, the police and other intelligence agencies. Markac knew about the participation of his inferiors and the crimes in Donji Lapac and Grubori, as he arrived there shortly after the events.

During a visit by Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak to the destroyed village of Donji Lapac, the Prosecutor claims that the members of the special police were praised for a “job well done”. Allegedly, Markac participated in the phony investigation in Grubori, intended to cover up the murder of the residents there and he sent the perpetrators of that crime, who committed yet another crime in Ramljani the very next day, to Zagreb, without subjecting them to disciplinary or other measures.