Nacional has learned from diplomatic sources at NATO headquarters in Brussels that an agreement was reached at a 20 to 21 May meeting held at the Crawford ranch in Texas between US President George Bush and NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to invite all of the Adriatic Charter members – Croatia, Albania and Macedonia – to NATO membership at the Bucharest NATO summit next spring. Nacional's sources have confirmed that the discussion at the Bush – Scheffer meeting revolved least around the invitation for Croatia, while the NATO General Secretary and President Bush concentrated most of their time on the issues of Macedonia and Albania, i.e. the problems still present in those countries.

Albania is still troubled by significant corruption, organised crime, the implementation of the rule of law and the influence of politics on the judicial system, while the problems in Macedonia revolve around political violence, poor Albanian representation in the armed forces, corruption and an unemployment rate of 36 percent. Unlike Croatia, whose top officials have not set foot into NATO headquarters over the past five months, the prime ministers and foreign affairs and defence ministers of both Albania and Macedonia have been there three to four times.

That speaks volumes of the pressure being exerted on the officials of both countries to speed up the pace of reforms and address their problems in order to get an invitation to full membership. The US position on NATO members and membership candidates is based primarily on the scope of their engagement in NATO military operations, cooperation with US soldiers and commanders in the field, in training and in the support of US foreign policy goals. This has in fact been demonstrated in the cases of Macedonia and Albania, who will likely, based on the attained criteria of the Western and recently accepted Eastern European countries, be the economically and politically weakest members of NATO, but who are doing everything they can to actively contribute to NATO operations around the world and to the efforts of the US coalition in Iraq. Croatia too has had the opportunity to discover that the increased deployment of Croatian soldiers to military missions has completely transformed the US policy to official Zagreb. The USA did an about face in its policy towards Zagreb in February of 2006. Foreign affairs minister Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic was in Washington at the time. With the widening of the ISAF mission to all of Afghanistan, US officials at the time asked the Croatian minister to pass their request for the deployment of an additional company of Croatian Army personnel to Afghanistan to the national leadership in Zagreb. The US administration was aware then that the request would not pass easily given the different positions of Prime Minister Sanader and President Mesic regarding US foreign policy.

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Croatia, however, reacted very quickly; Prime Minister Sanader endorsed the decision and promised firmly to meet the US request for assistance. President Mesic also agreed with the request, as the issue of stability in Afghanistan was a key aspect of the survival of NATO and its credibility. The USA was surprised by the prompt and positive response, especially with the reaction of President Mesic. It was a sign to the US administration that the Croatian leadership had a fully coordinated foreign policy and that it identified with the goals of US foreign policy.

The Americans were pleasantly surprised with another defence ministry decision which Nacional has uncovered and of which nothing has been known to date that followed a meeting with a NATO inspection team only a month after the Croatian foreign affairs minister's visit to the USA. Nacional has learned from the top echelons of the Croatian military that Croatia in March of 2006, at a Zagreb meeting with NATO officials, undertook the obligation to, in 2010 as a full member of NATO, double the number of soldiers in missions outside its national territory, up to about 1,600 to 1,800 personnel. This was entirely unknown up to now and not even Croatian MPs, who recently debated the Croatian Armed Forces Long Term Development Plan in Parliament, were informed, as the document and statements made by defence officials spoke of the engagement of 800 Croatian soldiers in NATO military operations from 2010 on, i.e. 8 percent of the Army. There was no desire to make public the outcome of that meeting in order to avoid negative reactions and a further drop in support for Croatian accession to NATO. At the meeting with the NATO expert team evaluating Croatia's progress on the road to NATO, it was agreed that the, for years now declared number of 800 Croatian Army personnel foreseen for deployment in NATO military missions, or on permanent stand-by, including a motorised infantry company, a platoon of de-mining engineers, a platoon of military police, a special services platoon, a nuclear-biological-chemical decontamination platoon, two medical teams, a transport helicopter and an engineer platoon for horizontal constructions, must be increased.

In one of the official defence ministry reports detailing the outcome of the meeting it reads: "…the new package of partnership goals has been agreed upon in March of 2006 during a visit from the NATO expert team and the PARP/MAP evaluation and includes the widening of some old goals i.e. a significantly greater contribution in personnel from 2010 on, for example… a motorised infantry battalion (instead of a company), engineer companies (instead of platoons) and other."

It was agreed in Zagreb that a motorised infantry company numbering from 150-300 soldiers must be increased to a motorised infantry battalion numbering from 700-750 soldiers, and a platoon of 40 personnel must be upped to a company of from 150 to 300 soldiers and so forth, which will in the end, when the widening covers all of the units declared for NATO, increase the number of Croatian soldiers to about 1,600 to 1,800 deployed or ready for deployment. No one has said that so many Croatian soldiers would be active in NATO mission at a given moment but there is, nevertheless, a likelihood of that happening as the obligation has been undertaken.

The current NATO concept and the agreement between NATO member defence ministers on the availability of eight percent of the Army of any national contingent for military operations outside the home country was adopted back at the 2004 summit in Istanbul. Three years have passed since then, however, and the requests for an increase in NATO military forces on the ground have grown significantly in the meantime, both because of the widening of existing military missions and the appearance of new crisis areas. Defence Minister Berislav Roncevic and other officials defining the defence policy towards NATO continue to cite the figure of 800 troops that are to be prepared by 2010 to join NATO military operations, and in doing so are glossing over the new obligation they undertook in March of 2006 based on which, for example, just one motorised infantry battalion will number about that many personnel. Besides this number of about 1,600-1,800 soldiers, a further 40 percent of Croatia's standing army must also be equipped and trained for rapid deployment. This refers to professional soldiers in the Guard's Brigades, special services battalions, the military police, engineers and similar units that will rotate through the above mentioned units declared for NATO military operations. It is estimated that this covers about a further 4,000 soldiers. Of the total of 10,300 professional members of the Army then, about 5,600 of them will see action in NATO military missions from 2010 on. This level of engagement and Croatia's readiness to contribute to NATO military missions could not go unnoticed. The Croatian national leadership has in the opinion of the US administration, through a series of concrete moves in the spring of 2006, become a credible and trustworthy partner to the USA, as promises were fulfilled very quickly, and because new obligations were also undertaken in spite of the opposition of what was then the majority of the Croatian public to NATO accession or the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. That was a signal to the USA to concretely back Croatia on its path to NATO membership. It was not only in meeting the American request for the deployment of additional Croatian troops to Afghanistan and the enlargement of the Croatian contingent to NATO-led operations from 2010 on that marked the political about-face in the relations with the USA, nor was it the fruit of President Mesic's change of heart vis-à-vis US foreign policy. These reasons were certainly very important, but in the final tally it was the fact that the USA has recognised in Croatia a country with, above all, an exceptionally stable democracy and political system, the only one of its kind in the Western Balkan area. Croatia has managed, in a relatively short period of time, in spite of the events of the war and the post-war difficulties, to transform itself into a very positive example of a transition country playing an active role in the stabilisation of the region.

A visit to Dubrovnik by US Vice President Dick Cheney to meet with Croatia's two top officials quickly followed Croatia's decision in the spring of 2006 to do more than what was expected of it. The US then offered assistance in the training of Croatian soldiers, several military exercises were held involved elite Croatian and American units, a program for the education of Croatian soldiers and officers in the USA was revived, and there was an offer to Croatian pilots at a meeting between Roncevic and Rumsfeld that they receive a part of their training in the USA with American pilots and on US aircraft.

Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader clinched his most significant foreign policy victory since taking over the post of prime minister in Washington in October. During that meeting with the Croatian delegation US President George Bush and his closest associates left not even the slightest doubt in their statements concerning Croatia. Their messages were unequivocal, firm and exceptionally positive. The impression is that things are running smoothly now, at least in the political sense when it comes to Croatian accession to NATO, as the information campaign being led by the national administration has also bolstered public support of NATO membership. Croatia could, however, very quickly, immediately after it receives the invitation, face huge problems, because what Croatia promised NATO officials through the Armed Forces Long Term Development Plan is not being carried out in time nor is there a will in the current defence ministry administration to fulfil what has been promised, which will make things significantly more difficult for the future defence minister in the next four-year mandate. It is evident that the feeling is that it is hardest to get into NATO, so promises were made right, left and centre to speed up the accession. Besides, no country that has made NATO membership has been thrown out of it, and it is believed that that goes for Croatia too, even if it does not fulfil the obligations it has undertaken. If this is the kind of thinking present in the Croatian defence sector, a quick sobering could be in the works as soon as next year when one NATO inspection follows another crossing out numerous promises and demanding explanations for unfulfilled items from the plan.

The meeting at CrawfordIt was agreed at the Bush – Scheffer meeting at Texas' Crawford ranch that putting off an invitation to NATO for Macedonia and Albania could create an unfavourable political climate and cause insecurity, unwelcome now on account of Kosovo. An invitation to both sides to join NATO would also send a strong signal to the region that reforms pay off. Besides, both countries are taking very active roles with their soldiers in all NATO-led operations.