Günter Verheugen When I read part of an interview the Jutarnji list daily had carried last week with Günter Verheugen, European Commission Vice President responsible for Entrepreneurship and Industry and before that the European Union's chief enlargement official, I did not know whether to be happy or dejected. In the interview given to a WAZ correspondent in Brussels the number two official in the European Commission said that it was an injustice that Croatia had not long before acceded to the European Union, as it meets all of the criteria, and that it did not happen as the result of strange doubts that it was protecting and hiding General Ante Gotovina, accused of having committed war crimes. "Croatia would already be a member of the EU had the secret service of one country not driven us all crazy with these tales."

I am happy that an official has finally, at least indirectly, admitted that Nacional and I were in the right when it came to Gotovina and the role of foreign secret services in lying to the Croatian and European public that he was being hidden and protected by the Croatian authorities. I am saddened to have had to have heard that from a foreigner, and not from our President or Prime Minister, who both knew very well what the facts where, who was lying in the Croatian press, and who was telling the truth, but chose to remain silent. When Croatia was not accepted into EU membership together with Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, and could even have acceded prior to them, the question is just how justified was then Croatian policy of the time and whether that kind of behaviour on the part of the Croatian authorities was justified by the goal.

Now that Verheugen has revealed the truth, and since there is no longer any danger of a cessation of the talks on Croatia's accession to the EU, perhaps the Prime Minister and President will summon up the courage to say publicly what was going on in the entire case, why Croatia has not already been admitted to EU membership, and could have had their been more courage, and that they publicly apologise on behalf of the Croatian leadership and vindicate all those who fell victim to a media and political game so harmful to Croatia's interests. And there were those who were then sacrificed, who careers were destroyed, because they knew and spoke the truth. But, looking into the past, I do not believe that either Ivo Sanader or Stipe Mesic will make this gesture and publicly state the truth today, when they did not dare to do so four years ago, when they maintained an opportunistic silence. I found myself under fire then, but have received one kind of satisfaction.

Exactly two weeks ago, on 1 September at 10 am I was invited to the consular department of the British embassy. In the presence of two officials I was told that, as of that day, the British Government was removing all restriction against my person, including the chief one which was a ban on entry into their country. I was banned from entering Britain, even after the visa regime was abolished, and all on account of Gotovina, or rather because I had said publicly that the British secret service was behind the disinformation, lies and imputations that the fugitive Gotovina was being protected and hidden by the Croatian Government. The consequence of that was a four-year ban on entry to Britain. With this gentlemanly gesture at the consulate the dispute is, as far as I am concerned, ended, but I have a feeling that within the British intelligence community they are very much questioning the roles of many people who had nosed around the region in its name during those years and lied both to London and Brussels that Croatia was protecting Gotovina, as a result of which a halt had been put then on Croatia's accession to the European Union.

Ranko Ostojic It all started on 10 June 2003 when Nacional ran an interview with the runaway General Gotovina. That I had met with him was a fact known not even by his attorneys Luka Misetic and Marin Ivanovic, as I worked out the details in the greatest discretion with attorney Marijan Pedisic, a friend of mine, who passed away just over a year ago. We met with Gotovina in a hotel in Venice.

He wanted very much to express exactly in the interview his desire that his case be resolved quickly to everyone's satisfaction, and during the interview he asked me to pass on his message to Stipe Mesic, Ivica Racan and the Hague tribunal. The message was clear: confident of his innocence he was prepared to give himself up to the authorities immediately if the Croatian authorities and the Hague tribunal would afford him the opportunity of meeting in Zagreb with Hague investigators, i.e. prosecutors, and to answer all of the questions he had not answered in the late 1990s when he had not been allowed to meet them as a result of Tudjman's policy that Croatian generals would not talk to Hague investigators.

Both Mesic and chief Hague prosecutor Carla Del Ponte were informed of the messages and the interview before it was published. Del Ponte sent her top crew, headed by Patrick Lopez Tereza, to Pantovcak to see what could be done about it. Mesic charged his chief of staff Zeljko Bagic to speak with them, who he informed of what Gotovina had said.

I was still naïve at the time, thinking that it was in the interest of everyone in Croatia and abroad to see the problem with Gotovina resolved expediently and as best as possible – that he return to Croatia of his own will as soon as possible, give his testimony to investigators and, if necessary, be remanded to police custody, but that he await the start of the trail as a free man, as he proposed. I first grasped that not everyone felt that that was the route to a solution when on 9 June of 2003, around 6 pm, a day ahead of the printing of the interview, I notified Croatian Television (HTV) and Nikola Kristic, the editor there at the time, what I was publishing in Nacional.

I wanted to announce this big news by way of the strongest media house in Croatia to achieve an immediate effect and start resolving the matter right away. Kristic told me he would have to speak with his superiors and that is was a question whether he would manage to put together a piece for the prime time news.

Günter Verheugen and Ivo Sanader I sensed fear in his voice, a fear I could not understand. After some ten minutes, probably after consulting with then HRT director Mirko Galic and after Galic's people consulted with then Prime Minister Racan, Kristic called me saying I was to come urgently to the HRT building on Prisavlje Street to give a short statement. I received a phone call in the elevator of the HTV headquarters on Prisavlje. It was Zinka Bardic, then spokesperson for the police department, who was much more than just a spokesperson, who asked me in a voice full of desperation and fear: "Is what I am hearing really true? Were you actually with Gotovina?" My third moment of doubt came while making the statement, taken on camera by Sanja Mikleusevic. Nervous, unready and completely uninformed, she suspiciously took a twenty-second sound bite from me. And that is what they aired on the prime time news. Croatian Television reduced the biggest event of the year in Croatia to a short sound bite laden with doubts. That was when the lights came on for me that something was amiss, but I could not even have imagined that a real plot was being concocted behind the scenes, a plot in which many took part, from foreign services and the Croatian authorities to the Croatian press.

I wanted to inform the of the possibility of Gotovina's surrender and that his return to Croatia would take a burden off his shoulders, but also resolve what was then the biggest political problem facing Croatia, which was, precisely because of Gotovina, under massive pressure from the international community. I did not then understand the role of Britain, until Deputy Prime Minister Goran Granic, after I had been directed to him by Prime Minister Racan, asked me to relate Gotovina's messages to the British ambassador in Zagreb. I met with the ambassador at his residence in Slavujevac Street. We spoke in the presence of Tesse Fras, and were joined by the US ambassador. I told them what Gotovina had told me, related Gotovina's sentiments and proposals to resolve the crisis, end his flight and return to Croatia.

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The British ambassador promised to pass all of Gotovina's proposals to the Hague and invited me to meet at his place again. He called me the next day and we met again on his terrace. He relayed the terms the Hague had spelled out and asked me to meet with representatives of the tribunal in order to establish a direct line of communication with the fugitive general. I accepted and was called by Thomas Osorio, an envoy of Carla Del Ponte, and exceptionally intelligent man of lively eyes, who had an excellent command of the Croatian language. He came to my office the next day and told me right away that he was coming as an official envoy of Del Ponte's and that the Hague tribunal considered me an unbiased mediator in their communication with Gotovina.

I repeated Gotovina's terms for a departure to the Hague, and he dictated what the Hague was willing to offer. The basic difference was that Gotovina wanted to come to Croatia, while the Hague wanted to organise a meeting in Bosnia & Herzegovina or somewhere else abroad. Switzerland and Mexico were mentioned. They demanded that Gotovina be taken to The Hague after his conversation with the investigators, with guarantees that he would be released after two to three months. I was very satisfied with the start of the negotiations in which both sides had put forward maximalist terms, which would, in the course of the negotiations, be reduced to the optimal terms acceptable to both parties. And when I was already convinced that the crisis would end favourably for all and that Gotovina would finally come home, the blows came, above all from the press, but from all quarters. They led to a break off of the talks, and a loss of mutual trust, with serious consequences for Croatia, which as a result of the sabotage of those talks did not accede to the Union three years ago.

Ivo Pukanic and Marijan Pedisic The responsible parties are known today. Some media houses, Jutarnji list and Globus foremost among them, followed by Feral and HTV, criticised both the initiative and me. President Mesic, who publicly supported the idea, was also attacked, even so far as to demand he relinquish his post. Journalists like Gordan Malic, Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, Ivica Dikic, Denis Kuljis, from HTV led by Zoran Sprajc, right up to the most ridiculous of them, Zeljko Peratovic, who claimed from his laughable Internet portal that I had met with Gotovina at Mesic's Pantovcak residence. I was subject to daily attacks. I could not believe the just how much malice there was among journalists. The chief theory put forward by the press at the time was Gotovina was in Croatia, and there were constant alleged sightings of Gotovina in Croatia appearing the newspapers.

These attacks blocked the negotiating process. The imputations went on for weeks, and a story was even concocted that I had revealed to the police the location at which I had met with the fugitive general. I told the public and the police only what Gotovina had given me permission to say – that I had met with him in one of the member states of the European Union. That also meant that he was hiding within the Schengen borders, where a passport is not required to move from one country to the next.

I did not understand at first what was happening. But near the end of the summer of 2003 I was at a barbeque at the Medvednica restaurant with then interior affairs minister Sime Lucin and Police Director Ranko Ostojic. Ostojic sat across from me, staring at the table and wolfing down cevapcici, while I detailed the situation surrounding Gotovina, telling them that he was inside the EU. I asked them to try to calm the media hysteria and take a firm position that Gotovina was not in Croatia. I asked them who them believed more, me, who had been with Gotovina, or Gordan Malic, who was the top proponent of the theory that Gotovina was hiding in the region. He had by then accused Gotovina in his articles that he was a wanted criminal in France, that he had supplied the IRA with weapons, that he was linked to the Italian mafia, all aimed at a negative public perception of Gotovina.

I came off as naïve then too, because I was telling this all to a person who was precisely then, which I did not know, at the helm of a para-police unit that was, in close collaboration with British agents, seeking for Gotovina in the region, placing information according to which he was here. Ostojic was one of those people with whom the British secret service was creating a web of disinformation that Gotovina was within reach of the Croatian authorities, and in doing so prevented Croatia from acceding to the EU. At the time I still was not aware of what was going on and who was behind it. I was racked with doubts after the meeting with Granic that the English services had their fingers in the entire affair, but not in my wildest dreams did I imagine that there was collusion between the Croatian press and foreign secret services, who were creating a negative perception in the public of all those who were in any way involved in finding a peaceful solution to this difficult problem by way of the Croatian press.

Preparations had started at the time for the parliamentary elections. Sanader won in late November, whom I informed of all of the details pertaining to Gotovina. I asked him to approach the issue seriously because the problem would otherwise hurt him considerably. I remember it as if happened yesterday. He told me: "As soon as I take power we will resolve the entire matter in an hour and a half." I imagined that he was quick and pragmatic, that he would adopt a decisive position and come clean with the truth. I was very wrong, as he too was frightened by the foreign secret services, which dictated his foreign policy to him over the coming two years. The notorious "non-paper" was published at the time, which the British secret service handed to the Croatian Government. It detailed nine points Croatian Government was to carry out so that it might be credible in its active participation of the hunt for Gotovina. There were all sorts of things there, from a ban on entry to the EU for certain Croatian citizens to wiretapping and spying on people, blackmailing judges and a guilty verdict for Hrvoje Petrac, singled out as Gotovina's chief accessory. Sanader's Government carried out all nine points, even though it was aware of exactly what was going on.

Ivo Sanader with Denis McShane President Mesic also knew what was going on, as the then head of the counter-intelligence agency, Franjo Turek, in October of 2003, at the insistence of Zeljko Bagic, made a presentation for him in which he, clearly and with argumentation, exposed the nature of the media and intelligence conspiracy. At the centre of the conspiracy to stop Croatia on its path to the European Union were Globus journalist Gordan Malic and the head of the British secret service in the region. Ranko Ostojic was also a part of the game, at the head of the secret para-police team. Malic was the link between Ostojic and the British agents and he placed in the press everything necessary to deceive the public. They had only one problem – that Turek had picked up on it all, listening in on 16 public phone booths from which Malic, convinced that no one could hear him, carried out his activities. Turek recorded them all and caught them in his net. Once he had connected the dots and grasped the nature of the conspiracy he took the entire presentation, in agreement with Bagic, then the second in charge in the secret services, to President Mesic. Realising what a "bomb" this was, and himself shaken by the brutal media attacks that came as a result of his public support of the initiative that the Gotovina case be resolved peacefully, he asked Turek to keep it under wraps until the elections had passed.

Having seen the dirty role played by Ostojic, one of the top people at the SDP, he feared that making the results of Turek's investigation public would help the HDZ get into power. He promised Bagic and Turek that he would act on the results of the investigation after the elections. The elections passed, the SDP lost, and nothing was done. That is to say, something was done, because Zeljko Bagic and Franjo Turek, because they had told the truth about the entire case, were chucked out of the service and onto the street – after having shown the presentation to Sanader and the new national leadership. Sanader, instead of gathering allies within the EU such as Germany and Austria, and making public the pressure and lies Croatia had been subjected to, bowed to the blackmail of foreign secret services and sold out Croatians who had worked for the good of the country and were the only ones to stand up to the bullying of foreign secret services. At that point I too became a "persona non grata" for Sanader as I was depicted in the public as a protector of Gotovina and of organised crime.

In the end it was demonstrated during Gotovina's arrest that he was at no time in Croatia, nor was he linked to the Croatian authorities. It was demonstrated that everything that Nacional had written was true, and that it had been entirely alone in doing so on the Croatian media scene, i.e. that what Malic, Butkovic, Cicak, Dikic, Peratovic and the rest of that motley crew had written about Gotovina was a lie. It all turned into one great shame for all who had taken part in a dirty game that brought no good to anyone. Those guilty continue to work and some are, instead of behind bars, Members of Parliament where they head the national security and internal policy committese. Journalists who had printed some many lies continue to be recognised members of the journalist’s guild, it is they who rule on the fates of others and continue to lie to the public. The politicians continue to maintain a sagacious silence, wiping their own poor behaviour from their own memories. In the end it was the English who turned out to be the fairest. They, having grasped what their agents had participated in, disbanded the entire MI6 network in the region and moved its centre from Zagreb to Budapest.

It is clear now what kind of adversity this has brought to individuals, and especially to the country, which could have – had a more prudent and decisive policy been followed – been a European Union member for several years now. Had the Gotovina case been resolved then in a sensible manner, Croatia would have been in the Union at the latest by 2007, and Gotovina would probably be a free man. This way, if we are lucky, Croatia will accede to the Union in 2011. The English are not so responsible for this, who had their own intra-European reasons for stopping Croatia on the road to the EU, as are Croatian politicians with their lets-make-a-deal and only at first glance pragmatic, and in fact cowardly, policies, and even more so some people from the ranks of the police and press who played an active role in the operation, creating misinformation and lies about Gotovina. They are directly responsible for Croatia's straggling on the path to the Union. Will the national leadership finally gather up the courage to admit, as Günter Verheugen did, what an injustice happened in Croatia and to Croatia in the middle of this decade, and who took part in it in Croatia? I fear not.

An advocate of Croatia's speedy accession to the EU German social democratic politician Günter Verheugen, who from 1999 to 2004, during the years that were key to setting the pace of Croatia's accession to the European Union, was a member of the European Enlargement Commission, was one of the most important advocates of as speedy as possible a Croatian accession to the European Union. Verheugen is 64 years old, is a graduate of history, sociology and political science at the universities of Cologne and Bonn and got involved in politics early on, first as a member of the German Liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). He left that party in 1982 after it left the ruling coalition with the Social Democratic Party, which he joined, quickly advanced through the party ranks. In 1983 he became an MP in the German parliament and was from 1983 to 1998 a member of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs. For three years he was deputy to the leader of the social democrats in parliament, and in 1998 served at a high post in the foreign affairs ministry. The next year, 1999, he left German parliament upon his appointment as the European Commission member responsible for enlargement.

It was a responsible and influential post, and he led the chief negotiations on the accession of ten new members – Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta and Cyprus – who became European Union members on 1 May 2004, which was the biggest single expansion of the European Union in its history, and prepared another two countries for membership – Bulgaria and Romania – who acceded on 1 January 2007. He demonstrated significant interest that Croatia too be numbered among these 12 countries that were to become members of the European Union, and on several occasion publicly stated this wish as the member of the European Commission responsible for enlargement. During those years he visited Croatia several times, with the aim of preparing its membership too.

Verheugen on 4 December 2002 first announced that Croatia could be included in the second round of enlargement, that is that it could join the European Union in 2007 together with Bulgaria and Romania. His statement was received with much satisfaction in Croatia, and then foreign affairs minister Tonino Picula even said that "there is still much to do to achieve that goal, so we should not let Verheugen's statement go to our heads." Verheugen, to speed up Croatia's accession to the European Union, came to Zagreb in November of 2003, just ahead of the elections for Croatian Parliament, and reiterated that Croatia could be included in the enlargements of the time. He said then in Zagreb that he supported Croatia and encouraged it to continue to work on meeting the criteria for accession to the European Union. If Croatia meets the criteria, Verhuegen said, he would in March of 2004 propose that negotiations be launched without delay on its entry to the European Union, which would lead to the status of an official candidate.

Verheugen then emphasised that "Croatia would not have to wait for the other countries of the region to meet the conditions for accession to the Union", as Croatia would be "evaluated on the basis of its own achievements without double standards, new demands or criteria." He added another important sentence, which was well received in Croatia given the various speculation that Croatia's accession would depend on the readiness of Romania and Bulgaria to enter the European Union. In his words, there was no reason for the European Union to not accept only one country into membership, if it was ready for it. In other words, Verhuegen felt that Croatia could enter the European Union even before Romania and Bulgaria if they fall behind in the reform process.

But it was then that massive pressure was exerted on Croatia to arrest the fugitive General Ante Gotovina, and Croatia's path to the European Union, as a result of accusations that it was hiding Gotovina, or at least not doing enough to capture him – were stopped. Verheugen said nothing about Croatia's accession over the following months, until October of 2004 when he was in Zagreb again. He was received in Zagreb at the top level. He was received by Croatian President Stipe Mesic, addressed MPs in Croatian Parliament, and took part in a closed session of Government after talks with Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. After the session Verheugen gave a statement that was to calm the Croatian public, worried about warnings that the case of the fugitive General Ante Gotovina could put Croatia's accession to the European Union on hold for an extended period of time. Verheugen said he would advise Luxembourg, the next country to preside over the revolving EU Presidency, to prepare by February or March of 2005 for the start of talks with Croatia. He reiterated to the members of Government that there would be no new conditions for Croatia. Progress would be made on the basis of merits. No country would wait on another, said Verheugen.

When asked if the Ante Gotovina case to stop that, Verheugen said, “After our discussions with the Government I do not believe that will happen. The Government cannot do what is impossible. It can arrest a person, if it knows where they are, but if it does not, then it is impossible. It cannot be held responsible for that", said Verheugen. Croatian Prime Minister Sanader judged Verheugen's statement that Croatia would not have to wait on anyone else as the most important one. But after that there was no significant progress in Croatia's EU accession process, and Croatia continued to come under the fire of accusations that it was harbouring Gotovina.

And that is how it was right up to the moment, in December of 2005, when Gotovina was captured on the Canary Islands, far from Croatia, which was proof that Croatia was unjustly stopped on its path to the European Union, a member of which it could long ago have been. In the meantime Verheugen has taken on a new job at the European Commission, no longer responsible for enlargement, and is now at a much more important post. He has become the European Commission member for entrepreneurship and industry, and is, besides, one of the five vice presidents of the European Commission. He is a very influential and important member of the European Commission, who was unscathed by an embarrassing scandal he found himself in the midst of when it was discovered that he was cheating on his wife with a 14 year younger secretary. Over the past few years there has been speculation that he could be appointed to the post of German Foreign Affairs minister.