There is a long-standing tradition in the United States that once a war starts all parties and politicians come together to support the President – unless of course there is some early and dramatic failure. Since the start of the Iraqi war, that tradition seems to have been quickly discarded and attacks on President Bush have been escalating.

Assaults on the White House are coming from a number of directions and on a variety of issues: with regard to the administration’s war plans and military performance, its conduct of international politics, its regional policy in the Middle East, and the “Bush Doctrine” as a whole. Such assaults are not confined to former leaders and Democratic politicians, but are found across the political spectrum among many well-respected public figures.

War Plans Under Scrutiny

The massive American military buildup and the first painless phase of the war against Iraq created the impression that the campaign would be swift and overwhelming. But when the forward thrust of U.S. forces halted some distance from Baghdad, and the fight for other cities proved troublesome, voices of dissent grew louder and the American media has relished in the debate. War is always fought primarily over information and oftentimes propaganda proves more deadly than missiles.

Each day since the start of the war, the American public has been bombarded with often severe criticisms of both the civilian and military leadership in the Pentagon. Retired generals and military strategists present alternative war scenarios and paint a gloomy picture of the “Rumsfeld strategy.” According to some ex-generals and several former Secretaries of Defense now acting as consultants for the major television outlets, U.S. military planners made several critical errors during the Iraqi campaign.

For instance, the U.S. evidently launched the war without adequate intelligence concerning the situation on the ground. The campaign started off with cruise missile attacks on specific buildings where Saddam Hussein was supposed to be located, but he evidently walked out alive to rally his troops. And despite precision bombing, the bulk of the Iraqi leadership survived the onslaught unscathed.

Moreover, there is still no credible information on the whereabouts of Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons program. Washington has yet to obtain the most important proof for launching the war. Otherwise, even if the military operation is a success and Saddam is dislodged from power, politically the mission could prove a failure and White House motives will come under intensive investigation.

With the media focusing primarily on American casualties, U.S. intelligence allegedly also failed to predict the extent of Iraqi resistance, guerrilla operations, and suicide bombings. The Pentagon and the CIA seemed to be fundamentally wrong in their assessments that most Iraqis would welcome the Americans with smiles and flowers while the Iraqi army would rapidly turn its guns against Saddam.

As always, reality is much more complex than either intelligence analysts or media critics admit. Saddam’s embedded terror machine has dissuaded the public from supporting the coalition forces and threatened with severe reprisals any indications of dissent. Most Iraqis have been careful not to demonstrate any support for American and British forces until they have absolute evidence that the dictator will be finally overthrown. And having been brainwashed that the American target is not the regime but the Iraqi homeland, some hard-core elements of the Republican Guard with nowhere to run seem willing to fight to the last man.

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has been subjected to intense attack for allegedly underestimating Iraqi troop strength and the size of the force necessary to destroy the regime. He seems to have disregarded Colin Powell’s dictum when the current U.S. Secretary of State led the First Gulf War: that overwhelming force was required in any American military operation. Furthermore, Rumsfeld is accused of interfering in military planning and overruling the views of his experienced generals.

Originally, Rumsfeld wanted a military “surgical operation” through the deployment of a mere 50,000 U.S. troops. This number grew to some 200,000, but when it became clear that Turkey was not willing to allow American forces to pass through its territory, in order to open a northern front in Iraq, the southern offensive suddenly became more vulnerable to counter-attack on its stretched supply lines. As a result, another 50,000 troops are currently being rushed into the region from the U.S.

Unlike during the 1991 Gulf War, when America’s goal was to liberate Iraqi occupied Kuwait, and virtually all the neighboring Arab countries were supportive, the objective of overthrowing the Baghdad regime has alienated fearful Muslim leaders. As the current war will need be followed by a large-scale and prolonged military occupation, anti-American attitudes are sure to accelerate both regionally and globally.

There is also intense domestic criticism of American relations with the Iraqi opposition. Whereas in Afghanistan, there was a credible political alternative and an embryonic regime waiting in the wings, no such political force has been effectively cultivated by Washington to take over after Saddam. There is also profound fear that the only factions with the power to capture the state are either Shi’ite radicals with close links to Tehran or Kurdish nationalists intent on establishing a separate state that could undermine Turkey. Not surprisingly, Secretary Rumsfeld has already warned the Iranians about interfering in the Iraqi conflict and is trying to prevent a Turkish military incursion against the Iraqi Kurds.

Although some of these criticisms may be justifiable, they are invariably exaggerated or focused on snapshots of the conflict rather than the bigger picture. Wars never proceed according to plans and prognoses and every military assault suffers setbacks, pauses, and casualties. Thus far the bulk of the American public is not turning against their commander-in-chief and the “Vietnam syndrome” seems limited to hard-core peace activists and assorted anti-Bush movements. But a new momentum may be building within the Democratic Party, which is looking toward next year’s presidential elections.

Thus far, Americans seem willing to accept a certain number of military casualties, unlike in Somalia, Lebanon, or the Balkans But the coming siege of Baghdad and the possibility of more substantial losses from unconventional assaults during months of occupation will sorely test public resolve and Bush’s popularity.

America’s International Alienation

Political attacks on Bush’s international approach have intensified since the Iraqi war began. While the campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan enjoyed broad international support, in the minds of various American security analysts Bush has been unable to prove that Iraq and global terrorism are closely interlinked. The terrorist bases that have been eradicated in Iraq were located in territories outside Saddam’s control. In addition to uncovering evidence that Baghdad has been developing mass destruction weaponry, the White House will be focused on discovering proof of Saddam’s links with international terrorists.

Some commentators have asserted that George W. is actually settling a personalized family feud because Saddam planned to assassinate his father after the Gulf War. Numerous American academics even contend that Bush has managed to turn a despised dictator like Saddam into a hero of the Arab masses, the Muslim world, and the “downtrodden” in general.

According to critics, the President’s inability to mobilize and enthuse UN Security Council members has cost him the support of world public opinion and triggered mass demonstrations that will reverberate negatively on America in the years ahead. The U.S. is less likely to gain support from its allies and other powers in any future political initiatives or military operations unless it works hard to restore the credibility of the United Nations.

Staunch Atlanticists, such as former National Security Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, argue that the United Nations despite all of its shortcomings is sometimes useful in pursuit of particular U.S. policy goals. It also helps Washington to share many of the burdens in peace-keeping and crisis management missions in various regional trouble spots. Above all, it creates the perception of international unity and consensus that has evaporated in the wake of the Iraqi campaign.

The role of the UN in Iraq’s post-war reconstruction is now also coming under fierce debate. U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, one of the architects of the Bush Middle East strategy, has rejected a strong UN function in Iraq. This is despite insistence by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the European Union, and various international aid groups that the United Nations should play a key part in rehabilitating post-war Iraq.

The Bush hard-liners prefer to relegate the UN to “a facilitating role,” fearing that the international body could dilute American efforts to establish a quasi-democratic and pro-American government. The U.S.-UN conflict is clearly heading for round two.
Middle Eastern Criticisms

In the minds of many Middle East watchers, the White House was mistaken in seeking to establish a democratic regime in Iraq in addition to its primary objectives of wiping out terrorist networks and disarming the Baghdad regime. By doing so, it may have bitten off more than it can chew. Typical governments in this unstable region include a blend of democracy and dictatorship—with an authoritarian presidency, a rubber-stamp parliament, and a pervasive secret police network that is able to keep national and religious extremism in check.

For example, if Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or any of the Gulf states were genuine democracies, then radical Islamicists could foment substantial popular unrest and even spark revolutions. Meanwhile, Israel would again be threatened from all sides. Ultimately, critics claim, democracies must germinate indigenously or they will be viewed as fragile foreign impositions that will collapse like packs of cards.

President Bush’s initiative for a broad Middle East peace deal is also facing stiff resistance from key Democratic and Republican allies in the U.S. Congress. Leading legislators are pressing the White House to adopt a more staunchly pro-Israeli position, while critics on the other side feel that the President is already too closely aligned with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

In a rare public split with the Bush administration over foreign policy, Republican congressional leaders are calling on the President and Secretary of State Colin Powell to moderate their support for a long-awaited Middle East peace plan. The plan is designed to create a Palestinian state within two to three years. Israel has objected to various parts of the plan, which was drafted last year by the U.S., the EU, Russia, and the UN.

The imminent release of the plan has concerned pro-Israeli Republicans and Democrats that the administration is undercutting Israel in order to appease Arab governments in the wake of the Iraqi war. The caucus is led by the House of Representative’s majority leader, Republican Tom DeLay. Many members of Congress object to the document’s demand that Israel and the Palestinian authorities take parallel steps toward peace. By contrast, Israel wants the Palestinian leaders to first prove that they have thwarted terrorism before the Jewish state makes any further concessions, including the withdrawal of troops and the curtailment of settlements in occupied Palestinian territory.

Republican and Democratic congressional leaders, in competing for Jewish voters and election campaign donors, are opposing any peace deal that does not require the Palestinians to change their government and end all terrorist activities. President Bush has privately assured congressmen that he is in agreement with this scenario. However, they remain deeply concerned that Secretary Powell and Prime Minister Tony Blair may soften his resolve following the fall of Baghdad. Blair and his EU colleagues assert that the resolution of the Palestinian problem is an essential follow-up to the Iraqi war. Indeed, Blair’s full backing for the current war has been partly contingent on American commitment to the Israeli peace agreement. If this collapses, so may Blair’s government.

Bush’s lukewarm support for the Israeli-Palestinian plan has worried the EU, the UN, and Russia that Washington is far from committed to a permanent peace settlement. Several Republican and Democratic leaders, including the House of Representatives Democratic leader Steny Hoyer, are sending Bush a letter signed by dozens of members, imploring him to adopt a position backing the Sharon government. The President may have trouble convincing voters about the peace plan if Congress were to oppose it.

Either way, President Bush faces problems either on the home front or on the foreign front. Opposition to the peace plan will further alienate members of the UN Security Council, create serious ruptures with Arab allies, and give another boost to international terrorism on the pretext of fighting the “American-Zionist plot” that is allegedly targeting the entire Muslim world.

Devaluing the Bush Doctrine

Aside from all the tactical and regional criticisms, the most severe attacks on the Bush doctrine concern the strategies and objectives of American policy. Above all, American internationalists and the Democratic leadership complain that the “Bush Doctrine” is a recipe for disaster because it will isolate the United States, create a permanent rift with the European Union and other allied governments, deeply fracture relations with Russia and China, and actually hurt international cooperation on the anti-terrorism front. Hence, perversely, it will work against American national security interests.

In particular, the strategy of military “pre-emption” is widely viewed as a dangerous international precedent, because various states in conflict could manipulate the pretext of future military threat to launch offensive wars against their neighbors. While “preventive” wars are considered a valid response to a measurable, growing, and imminent threat, preemptive offensives are open to widely divergent interpretations.

Bush critics fear that with the attack on Iraq, the President has unleashed a new unpredictable era of “international anarchy” that will be difficult to contain as the U.S. simply cannot intervene in every corner of the globe. Moreover, there are no alternative anchors of international security that can forcefully deter or contain any mounting conflict.

The President’s defenders claim that no power would be able to emulate the United States and that without American resolve in the face of rogue states and UN prevarications, international relations would become even more chaotic. The offensive against Iraq and the forcible removal of Saddam Hussein will send a powerful signal to other dictatorial regimes that their days may be numbered and that any threats against the U.S. will meet with a powerful response.

The debate over the impact of the “Bush Doctrine” is sure to heat up after the war. Two opposing sides will crystallize: the hard-liners and the compromisers. The hard-liners will declare the Iraqi war a full-blown success that demonstrates the need for further offensives against especially dangerous dictators regardless of the absence of a UN consensus.

The compromisers will argue that it is essential for America to return to international institutions and restore UN credibility. Indeed, the Iraqi war may have served as a valuable lesson for all sides that delay and prevarication in dealing with brutal governments creates major rifts among the world powers and undermines the significance and purpose of the UN.

And such a debate could be a central factor in the forthcoming presidential election campaign. The first President Bush won the Gulf War and lost the peace to Bill Clinton, who zeroed in on economic issues that were of primary concern to the electorate. The second Bush could also fall victim to the ongoing economic downturn in the U.S. even if he wins Iraq and even if his doctrine were to endure. And there are many Democratic Party leaders who are planning for a “regime change” in Washington in November 2004 and are increasingly willing to challenge the commander-in-chief.